Sustainable Fault-handling Of Reconfigurable Logic Using Throughput-driven Assessment by Sharma, Carthik
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2008 
Sustainable Fault-handling Of Reconfigurable Logic Using 
Throughput-driven Assessment 
Carthik Sharma 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Sharma, Carthik, "Sustainable Fault-handling Of Reconfigurable Logic Using Throughput-driven 
Assessment" (2008). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 3498. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/3498 
SUSTAINABLE FAULT-HANDLING OF RECONFIGURABLE LOGIC 
USING THROUGHPUT-DRIVEN ASSESSMENT 
by 
CARTHIK ANAND SHARMA 
B.Tech. Kakatiya University, 2001 
M.S. University of Central Florida, 2004 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Engineering 
in the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
in the College of Engineering and Computer Science 
at the University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
Summer Term 
2008 
Major Professor: Ronald F. DeMara 
© 2008 Carthik Anand Sharma
 ii
ABSTRACT 
A sustainable Evolvable Hardware (EH) system is developed for SRAM-based 
reconfigurable Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) using outlier detection and 
group testing-based assessment principles.  The fault diagnosis methods presented herein 
leverage throughput-driven, relative fitness assessment to maintain resource viability 
autonomously.  Group testing-based techniques are developed for adaptive input-driven 
fault isolation in FPGAs, without the need for exhaustive testing or coding-based 
evaluation.  The techniques maintain the device operational, and  when possible generate 
validated outputs throughout the repair process. 
Adaptive fault isolation methods based on discrepancy-enabled pair-wise comparisons 
are developed.  By observing the discrepancy characteristics of multiple Concurrent 
Error Detection (CED) configurations, a method for robust detection of faults is 
developed based on pairwise parallel evaluation using Discrepancy Mirror logic.  The 
results from the analytical FPGA model are demonstrated via a self-healing, self-
organizing evolvable hardware system.  Reconfigurability of the SRAM-based FPGA is 
leveraged to identify logic resource faults which are successively excluded by group 
testing using alternate device configurations.  This simplifies the system architect’s role 
to definition of functionality using a high-level Hardware Description Language (HDL) 
and system-level performance versus availability operating point.  System availability, 
throughput, and mean time to isolate faults are monitored and maintained using an 
Observer-Controller model.  Results are demonstrated using a Data Encryption Standard 
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(DES) core that occupies approximately 305 FPGA slices on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 
FPGA.  With a single simulated stuck-at-fault, the system identifies a completely 
validated replacement configuration within three to five positive tests.  The approach 
demonstrates a readily-implemented yet robust organic hardware application framework 
featuring a high degree of autonomous self-control. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Reliable and efficient detection, isolation, and handling of failures within electronic 
circuits are fundamental issues in the design of dependable devices.  With production 
exceeding 100 million units per year, SRAM-based FPGA devices are frequently used in 
a wide range of embedded applications requiring high levels of reliability and 
availability. 
1.1. Need for Evolvable Hardware Regeneration Methods and Group Testing-
based Fault Diagnosis 
Reconfigurable devices, such as FPGAs, enable new fault handling techniques based on 
evolvable hardware regeneration.  Evolvable hardware regeneration techniques use the 
principle of biological evolution to handle faults.  Using evolutionary techniques such as 
genetic algorithms and cellular automata, the existing redundant hardware resources are 
reused or rewired to occlude the fault.  The repair process can take place online when the 
hardware is in active use, or offline when the regeneration occurs as part of a process 
outside the normal computation dataflow. 
Such techniques are highly relevant to many embedded device applications, including 
remote sensing, applications in hazardous environments, and space missions.  For 
instance, deep space satellites such as Stardust contain over 100 FPGA devices [1] while 
NASA terrestrial applications routinely employ FPGAs extensively for tasks ranging 
from launch control to signal processing.  SRAM-based FPGAs are of significant 
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importance due to their high density, unlimited reprogrammability, and growing use in 
mission-critical/safety-impacting applications. 
Depending on the application, these devices encounter harsh environments of 
mechanical/acoustical stress, high ionizing radiation, and thermal stress.  Simultaneously, 
they are required to operate reliably for long durations with limited or absent capabilities 
for diagnosis/replacement in the case of remote applications.  For example, in Aerospace 
Technology, Space Science, and Earth Science enterprises, the impact from increased 
safety and autonomy for FPGAs is highly relevant.  On-going research at Ames [2] and 
JPL [3] has focused specifically on employing the reconfigurability inherent in various 
field programmable devices to increase their reliability and autonomy using evolutionary 
mechanisms. 
Ground-based applications of FPGAs such as data acquisition devices and 
instrumentation systems seek to incorporate self-repair capabilities and provide extended 
calibration cycles.  One such application is Kennedy Space Center's Advanced Data 
Acquisition System (ADAS) [4].  ADAS is a signal acquisition and processing system for 
launch control measurements typical of real-time NASA applications that heavily utilize 
FPGAs and have high reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements.  Some 
target components that will benefit from evolvable hardware repair include Analog 
Signal Modules, Digital Signal/Control Modules, and Power Management Modules. 
There is the need to integrate multiple phases of the fault handling process in an 
integrated manner.  Further, this should ideally be done while maintaining the uptime, 
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and availability of the reconfigurable device.  Evolutionary mechanisms can actively 
restore mission-critical functionality in SRAM-based FPGA devices.  They provide an 
attractive alternative to device redundancy for resolving permanent degradation due to 
radiation-induced stuck-at-faults, thermal fatigue, oxide breakdown, electro-migration, 
and other failures.  Potential benefits include recovery without the increased weight and 
size normally associated with spares.  Without regeneration, spare capacity is finite.  
Therefore, an evolutionary fault handling strategy that relies upon resource recycling by 
means of leveraging the reconfigurability of FPGAs is required.  Regeneration also 
provides for graceful degradation of performance with time, where resources are 
constantly recycled with minimal impact on system availability.  The capability to 
recycle resources at a variable rate, as afforded by evolutionary mechanisms provides the 
capability to delay refurbishment to maintain required availability and throughput 
requirements.  Such a strategy would rely upon fault isolation to accelerate the 
evolutionary repair.  However, failures need not be precisely diagnosed due to automatic 
evaluation of FPGA residual functionality through intrinsic assessment using a specified 
fitness function. 
Evolutionary mechanisms rely upon efficient fault detection and isolation schemes.  Fault 
detection triggers the regeneration operation.  Robust fault detection techniques are 
required to detect fault and failures with a low latency.  Fault location methods provide 
inputs to the repair mechanism which accelerate the repair process, and reduce the search 
space of candidate solutions to the fault scenario.  The fault isolation technique identified 
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in this work is one such method for isolating faults with low latency and minimal 
overheads. 
1.2. Fault Handling in Reconfigurable Devices 
An operational failure occurs when the service delivered deviates from its as-built 
specification.  A resource fault is the cause of such failures.  Fault handling refers to the 
entire process by which potential or actual failures are dealt with.  Ideally, fault handling 
maintains failure-free functionality. 
The process of improving fault handling typically involves detection, isolation, 
diagnosis, and repair.  The detection phase consists of identifying the presence of a fault 
in the device.  A fault is said to be detected when the effects of a corresponding failure is 
observed.  Depending on whether the inputs applied manifest an observable failure, the 
fault is either be perpetually articulated or intermittently articulated.  The articulation of 
the fault, and hence its potential for detection, relies on the mapping of the functional 
design to the physical resources.  Once a failure has been detected, it may be possible to 
isolate the faulty resources.  Fault location or isolation determines the physical location 
of the faulty components.  The granularity of isolation may vary, depending on the 
architecture, the algorithm, and the isolation tools available.  Fault diagnosis thus deals 
with the determination of the symptoms and the reason behind the observed failure.  A 
symptom is an observable effect of a fault.  Failures are among the most easily observed 
symptoms of a fault and are the basis for the isolation methods developed in the proposed 
research.  The diagnosis phase may involve obtaining the response of the device to an 
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exhaustive set of inputs using a tool designed solely for performing diagnostic tests.  The 
last phase consist of fault repair, wherein the effects of the fault are ameliorated to reduce 
the occurrence or impact of future failures.   
The particular fault handling approach can be classified on the basis of when the faults 
are accounted for in the development cycle.  Design Time approaches place the emphasis 
on Fault Avoidance strategies through design strategies that avoid the occurrence of 
faults.  Execution Time or Run Time approaches tackle the problem by using Fault 
Tolerance and Fault Evasion methods.  A Fault-Tolerant system is characterized by its 
ability to provide uninterrupted service, conforming to the desired levels of reliability 
even in the presence of faults.  A dependable or reliable system is one which offers a 
level of service that is characterized by its availability or readiness for use when desired.   
Embedded fault-handling techniques can also be broadly categorized as diagnostic-based 
[5], coding-based [6], or redundancy-based [7], depending on the method used to 
implement fault-handling.  Diagnostic-based techniques execute a supplemental 
procedure that applies a test vector to a subset of the physical resources.  While 
diagnostics offer a compact approach, they can suffer from unavailability of throughput 
during testing, a large detection latency, and intractability of search as the number of 
physical resources and their piecewise interactions grow large [8].  Coding-based 
techniques map the input values to an alternate representation to enforce constraints on 
the validity of the outputs.  Such encodings based on parity, CRC, Berger, and other 
codes can be effective for data storage and transmission [9].  However, they preclude the 
occurrence of failures that might map one valid codeword onto another, and thus their 
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general applicability for FPGA logic resources is limited.  To avoid such limitations, 
embedded techniques frequently rely on component or system-level redundancy. 
Fault detection methods are central to fault handling strategies.  Fault detection can be 
carried out by a mechanism outside the domain of the system under observation.  In some 
cases it is not feasible to have a separate supervisory system in addition to the system 
under test.  For such a system to be fault tolerant, it is imperative that the fault detection 
tool or system used be fault-tolerant as well, since it will be a part of the system under 
observation.  To maintain acceptable availability levels, reduction of the fault detection 
latency is essential.  An evolutionary hardware repair strategy can use the information 
provided by the fault isolation strategy to speed up the repair process.  In CRR, accurate 
knowledge of the physical location of the fault can provide useful inputs to the repair 
algorithm.  The fault detection and isolation strategy used should ideally be capable of 
identifying and locating faults without requiring special test inputs, or an interruption in 
the normal data throughput.  The hardware resources used by the detector should be 
minimal, in order to reduce the number of points of failure, and to conserve floor space.  
The detector should be fault-secure meaning it does not propagate incorrect outputs in the 
presence of a fault.  Section 2.2 provides a detailed overview of selected fault detection 
strategies. 
1.3. Individual and Population-Centric Fault Assessment 
Traditional approaches to fault-detection typically rely on coding-based schemes or 
redundancy using a single voter, comparator, or error detector.  Those fault checkers 
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possess a single point-of-failure exposure involving the detector elements, or must rely 
upon special test-vectors or data encodings to isolate them.  Detector components in the 
reliability path have been referred to as golden elements [10] because the fault-handling 
strategy relies on them to be fault-free.  Also, significantly, previous methods test 
individual configurations or resource units to evaluate their fitness.  While such 
individual-fitness centric methods provide fault coverage on the device level, they do not 
lend to an adaptive, evolving system. 
In a redundant system, the problem of fault detection can be simplified by the fact that if 
there are no faults, then the outputs of the redundant elements should be identical.  An 
observed deviation from the this property would imply that the disagreement is a result of 
a failure in at least one of the redundant components.  Natural laws of competition, as 
seen in biological evolution can be applied to improve the performance of electronic 
circuits.  In fault-detection, a deviation from the normal behavior, as determined by 
comparison with another individual design, signifies a state of decreased  fitness, as a 
result of the manifestation of a hardware fault.  
The idea of competition can also be extended to the repair problem, using competitive 
pairing as a fitness evaluation technique.  Traditional GAs use an absolute measure of 
fitness for the individuals to search for improved solutions.  In this work, the  fitness of 
an individual design configuration depends on relative measures computed over a period 
of time.  The proposed fitness assessment process involves accumulation of discrepancies 
across multiple random pairings with other individuals from the population.  Such a 
population-based approach greatly simplifies the process of fault diagnosis, and uses the 
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fact that the circuit under test continues to operate for the duration of its useful lifetime to 
accrue information about the performance of competing individuals.  By keeping the 
method of fault isolation simple, the cost of repair is reduced and amortized over time, 
thus providing a fault-secure system without acceptable overhead. 
1.4. Group Testing Techniques and Applications to Fault Tolerance 
Group testing is a field of mathematics concerned with the development of efficient 
algorithms to identify defective members from a large population.  The origin of group 
testing is attributed to Robert Dorfman who proposed the first application during World 
War II.  He devised a scheme for testing blood samples from millions of United States 
army draftees for cases of syphilis [11].  He proposed that the blood samples be pooled 
for testing, in order to reduce the number of tests required and the associated cost and 
effort.  If a pool of samples tested positive for syphilis, then the samples that contributed 
to the pool would be subject to individual testing.  Though this idea of testing groups to 
identify faulty units was not practically implemented at the time, it gained currency and 
has been the subject of intensive research since.  The monograph [12] provides a detailed 
look into the current state of group testing applications.  The fundamental group testing 
problem is to identify a subset Q of defective items from a set P, by conducting the 
minimum number of tests on v – subsets of P.  A test seeks to identify whether a 
particular v – subset is defective, as shown by a positive outcome of the test [11].  Group 
testing algorithms are classified as shown in Figure 1.1. 
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 Figure 1.1: Group Testing Algorithms 
Probabilistic group testing theory assumes a known probability p of an item being 
defective, and uses it to guide the isolation process.  In Combinatorial Group Testing 
(CGT), it is often assumed that D is the subset of defective items among S items whereby 
p = |D| = |S|.  In sequential group testing algorithms, tests are conducted in succession so 
that the results of previous tests are known to guide the current test.  In a non-adaptive 
test, the tests are pre-designed and executed in parallel, without cognition of the result of 
other tests.  In a multi-stage algorithm, successive stages of tests utilize informative from 
previous stages, and tests in a particular stage are executed in parallel.  Testing is 
conducted using a checker or a detector which tests subgroups comprising items from S.  
A group testing algorithm is reasonable if it contains no test whose outcome can be 
predicted from outcomes of other tests conducted either previously or simultaneously.  
To minimize the number of tests required to identify the defectives, it is sufficient to 
consider only reasonable algorithms as otherwise the algorithm would be sub-optimal 
with respect to this criteria.  However, it is not necessary to restrict use to only reasonable 
algorithms as there many be me practical advantageous to the fault handling process 
when more general techniques are used.  This is especially the case when FPGAs must be 
 9
supported on long missions without reducing availability due to the need to execute 
additional tests. 
CGT techniques have been applied to DNA library screening [13] and more recently to 
hardware fault detection [14].  Efficient algorithms designed for reconfigurable 
architectures that are capable of solving the fault isolation problem are particularly useful 
in NASA applications. 
1.5. Contributions of this Dissertation 
Improving the fault tolerance of reconfigurable devices is a fundamental issue to be 
considered while using such devices in failure-prone environments.  This dissertation 
develops a strategy for the integration of multiple phases of the fault handling process for 
reconfigurable devices.  While traditional approaches to these problems rely on unique 
instances of dedicated hardware elements, this dissertation investigates a new technique 
based on iterative pairwise comparison and functional regeneration.  Under the proposed 
approach, an initial population consisting of a set of functionally identical (same input-
output behavior), yet physically distinct (alternative design or place-and-route 
realizations) FPGA configurations are produced at design time.  The performance of 
these configurations is evaluated by comparing them in pairs.  The result of the pairwise 
comparisons are then utilized to realize a fault location strategy.  The fault location 
information obtained can then be used to guide the hardware regeneration process.  
Evolutionary repair techniques inspired by Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are used to realize 
the repair.  The methods presented here provide, for the first time, a fault isolation 
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strategy that works in conjunction with an evolutionary refurbishment mechanism.  
Significantly, the group testing-based isolation strategy presented here does not require 
the device to be taken completely offline, or for the resources to be tested exhaustively.  
This dissertation provides an example of how fault isolation can be achieved while 
maintaining the system’s availability as measured by its goodput.  
The competitive evolutionary method presented here leverages information contained in a 
population of alternatives to enable the refurbishment of faulty configurations.  In the 
context that functional elements are groupings of the underlying physical resources, this 
research proposes utilization of Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) methods to analyze 
the expected performance.  A comprehensive toolkit for injecting stuck-at faults in FPGA 
logic for the purpose of evaluating group testing algorithms is developed.  This is used to 
demonstrate the efficiency of  CGT techniques in fault isolation.  CGT methods are used 
to develop algorithms for isolating faults using the minimal number of pairings to 
establish optimality bounds.  Further, analytical equation which describe the bounds of 
the system are derived.   
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CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS WORK 
Fault tolerance techniques include both Fault Avoidance and Fault Handling approaches.  
Fault Avoidance strives to prevent malfunctions from occurring.  This approach increases 
the probability that the system is functioning correctly throughout its operational life, 
thereby increasing the system’s reliability.  Implementing Fault Avoidance tactics such as 
increasing radiation shielding can protect a system from Single Event Effects.  If those 
methods fail, however, Fault Handling methodologies can respond to or recover lost 
functionality.  Whereas some fault handling schemes maintain system operation, some 
fault handling schemes require removing the system offline to recover from a fault, 
thereby decreasing the system’s availability.  This limited decrease in availability, 
however, can increase overall reliability. 
Hardware failures in FPGA occur variously due to device degradation over age, or due to 
environmental factors.  Ionization, electromigration, hot carrier effects, and other device 
degenerative effects may cause device faults in the FPGAs used by such applications.  In 
all of the above scenarios, these devices are mandated to operate reliably for long mission 
durations with limited or absent capabilities for diagnosis/replacement and little onboard 
capacity for spares.  Specifically, when in a space environment, FPGAs are subject to the 
effects of high-energy particles or radiation.  Cosmic rays and high-energy protons can 
cause malfunctions to occur in systems located on FPGAs.  These malfunctions may be a 
result of Single-Event Latch-ups (SELs) or Single-Event Upsets (SEUs).  SEUs are 
transient in nature, inverting bits stored in memory cells or registers, whereas SELs may 
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be permanent by inducing high operating current into sensitive devices.  While all FPGAs 
containing memory cells or registers are vulnerable to SEUs, anti-fuse FPGAs are 
particularly resilient since they do not depend upon SRAM cells to store its configuration.  
Reconfigurable FPGAs, on the other hand, store its configuration in SRAM cells, which 
increases the risk to SEUs.  Over the years, designers have developed methods for SRAM 
FPGAs to allow reconfigurability in space applications while mitigated the risk of SEUs. 
Radiation-hard SRAM FPGAs have fulfilled the rising demand for FPGAs in space 
applications.  Before their availability, designers of satellites and rovers had no serious 
alternative to the one-time programmable anti-fuse FPGA.  If the inherent fault handling 
capability of anti-fuse FPGAs was not sufficient, designers were restricted to employing 
Design-time Redundancy methods.  Due to the reconfigurable nature of SRAM FPGAs, 
radiation-hard SRAM FPGAs have allowed designers to consider other fault handling 
methods- namely Run-time Fault Handling methods. 
2.1. Taxonomy and Nomenclature of FPGA Fault Tolerance Techniques 
Figure 1.1 primarily divides Fault Handling approaches into two categories based on its 
method of implementation [15].  Architecture-based fault recovery techniques [16] 
address faults at the level of the device, allowing manufacturers to increase the 
production yield of their FPGAs.  These techniques typically require modifications to the 
current FPGA architectures that end-users cannot perform.  Once the manufacturer 
modifies the architecture for the consumer, the device can tolerate faults from the 
manufacturing process or faults occurring during the life of the device.  Concealing the 
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fault through the underlying fabric of the FPGA is advantageous; users need not know of 
the occurring hardware faults.  Despite making faults transparent to the user, the ability of 
these methods to tolerate faults is limited in both type and number. 
 
Figure 2.1: Classification of FPGA Fault Handling Methods 
Configuration-based methods, however, depend upon the end-user for implementation.  
These higher-level approaches use the configuration bitstream of the FPGA to integrate 
redundancy with a user’s application.  By viewing the FPGA as an array of abstract 
resources, these techniques may select certain resources for implementation, such as 
those exhibiting fault-free behavior.  Whereas Architecture-based methods typically 
attempt to address all faults, Configuration-based techniques may consider the 
functionality of the circuit to discern between dormant faults and those manifested in the 
output.  This higher-level approach can determine whether Fault Recovery should occur 
immediately or at a more convenient time. 
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Figure 2.1 further separates Configuration-based Fault Handling methods into two 
categories based on whether an FPGA’s configuration will change at run-time.  Design-
time Redundancy methods embed processes into the user’s application that mask faults 
from the system output.  These methods are quick to respond and recover from faults due 
to the explicit redundancy inherent to the processes.  This speed, however, does come at 
the cost of increased resource usage and power.  Even when a system operates without 
any faults, the overhead for redundancy is continuously present.  
In addition to this constant overhead, these methods are not able to change the 
configuration of the FPGA.  A fixed configuration limits the reliability of a system 
throughout its operational life.  For example, a Design-time redundancy method may 
tolerate one fault and not return to its original redundancy index.  This reduced reliability 
increases the chance of a second fault causing a system malfunction. 
FPGA Run-time
Fault Handling
Static Methods Dynamic Methods
Offline
Recovery
Spare
Configs
Spare
Resources
Online
Recovery
 
Figure 2.2: Overview of Run-time Fault Handling Methods 
Run-time Fault Handling methods strive to increase reliability and Sustainability by 
modifying the configuration of the FPGA to adapt to faults.  This allows a system to 
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remove accumulated SEUs and avoid permanently faulty resources to reclaim its lost 
functionality.  In addition, Run-time schemes can transform faulty resources into 
constructive components by incorporating stuck-at faulty behavior into the circuit’s 
functionality.  External processors, which cost additional space, typically determine how 
to recover from the fault.  These methods also require additional time either to 
reconfigure the FPGA or to generate the new configuration. 
Within Run-time Fault Handling,  Figure 2.2 illustrates two classes: Static and Dynamic 
methods.  Of these, Dynamic fault handling methods are the primary focus of this work.  
Section 2.2 describes and compares the existing Static Run-time techniques and Section 
2.3 addresses the Dynamic Run-time approaches in relation to the concepts used in this 
work. 
2.2. Static Run-time Fault Handling Methods 
 Static methods may recover from a fault utilizing design-time compiled spare 
configurations or re-mapping and rerouting techniques utilizing spare resources.  The 
resource allocation and/or pre-designed configurations are independent of the location an 
nature of faults detected during run-time.  These methods take advantage of the regularity 
of the FPGA’s architecture to implement redundancy structures or for designing alternate 
configurations.  Spare configuration methods must provide sufficient configurations and 
require storage space overhead for these, whereas spare resource methods must allocate 
sufficient resources to facilitate a repair. 
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 Spare Configuration-based approaches rely on a population of alternate configurations 
that each use a different set of logical resources to respond to faults.  These can be 
created either at design-time, or at runtime, after the fault has occurred.  The pre-
compiled configuration based technique [17] creates alternative configurations at design 
time that use different equivalent columns of FPGA resources.  In their non-overlapping 
scheme, which has the least resource overhead, a total of C(k+m, m) = (k+m)!  / (m!k!)  
configurations are required to tolerate faults in m columns, where k is the number of 
columns in the base configuration.  The required design-time effort for this approach is 
high, as it requires manual modification of the design to fit into column sets.  Also, the 
number of horizontal routes available to the designer is reduced by the resources 
consumed by the approach.  The fitness-based and population-based evolutionary 
hardware approaches for Field Programmable Transistor Arrays (FPTAs) proposed by 
Keymeulen et al. [18] creates alternative configurations for anticipated faults and at 
runtime for observed faults respectively.  This method provides good resource coverage 
and passive runtime operation, however system uptime is impacted severely by failure 
occurrence.  Also, additional external computational capacity is required to implement 
the genetic algorithm that creates the population-based solution at runtime. 
Spare Resource-based methods such as the one proposed by lach et al [19] rely on the 
availability of standby resources of varying granularity to address faults.  Lach’s 
deterministic approach provided redundant resources at design time.  This approach 
segments the FPGA into static tiles at design time with a known functionality, some 
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redundant resources, and a pre-designed alternate configuration.  Spare tiles can be 
selected when needed, but their functionality is predetermined and thus limited.  Dutt et 
al[20] provide an incremental re-routing method for increased flexibility to tolerate fault 
on-the-fly.  In this method, the FPGA is initially routed without any extra interconnects 
for reconfiguration.  The technique relies on node-covering in which reconfiguration is 
achieved by constructing replacement chains of cells from faulty cells to spare or unused 
cells.  Using a cost-directed depth-first search strategy, they minimize the overheads 
involved in rerouting interconnects when responding to faults.  Other innovative methods 
to tolerate faults using spare resources include Lakamraju and Tessier’s[21] intra-cluster 
repair.  The authors approach fault tolerance for cluster-based FPGA which group 
multiple LUT/FF pairs together in clusters.  Their method that takes advantage of logical 
redundancy in such clusters by replacing fault LUT inputs and logic resources unused in 
the original design mapping by defining methods for LUT Input Exchange and Basic 
Logic Element exchange.  All these re-routing strategies that involve spare resources 
require the device to be offline, and the support of an external system to complete the re-
routing procedure. 
2.3. Dynamic Run-time Fault Handling Methods 
Dynamic methods aim to allocate spare resources or otherwise modify the configuration 
during run-time after detecting the fault.  Whereas these approaches offer the flexibility 
of adapting to emergent fault scenarios, additional time is necessary to generate 
appropriate configurations to repair the specific faults.  Offline recovery methods require 
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the FPGA’s removal from operational status to complete the refurbishment.  Online 
recovery methods endeavor to maintain some degree of data throughput during the fault 
recovery operation, increasing the system’s availability.  
2.3.1. Offline Recovery Methods 
2.3.1.1. Genetic Algorithm Repair 
Genetic Algorithms (GA) are inspired by evolutionary behavior of biological systems to 
produce solutions to computational problems [Mitchell 1998].  Suitable for complex 
search spaces, GAs have proven valuable in a wide range of multimodal or discontinuous 
optimization problems.  Previous research has investigated the capability of GAs to 
design digital circuits [Miller et al. 1997] and repair them upon a fault [Keymuelen et al., 
2000].  Vigander [2001] proposes the use of GAs to repair faulty FPGA circuits.  As a 
proof of concept, Vigander implements extrinsic evolution, utilizing a simulated feed-
forward model of the FPGA device with genetic chromosomes representing logic and 
interconnect configurations. 
The evolution process begins with initializing a population of candidate solutions.  These 
initial solutions contain different physical implementations of the same functional circuit.  
In the midst of a fault, the performance of each configuration is evaluated, revealing 
which configurations are most affected by the fault.  If none of the available 
configurations provides the desired functionality, then genetic operators create a new 
population of diverse candidate solutions from the previous configurations.  Those 
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previous configurations having a higher performance rating are more likely to be selected 
and combine with other configurations by the Crossover genetic operator.  Additionally, 
the Mutation genetic operator injects random variations in the newly created candidate 
solutions.  Vigander also makes use of a Cell Swap operator that allows the functionality 
and connectivity of a faulty cell to swap with a spare cell.  The GA evaluates the newly 
created solutions and replaces poorer performers in the old population with better 
performers in the current population to create a new generation of candidate solutions.  
This evolutionary process repeats, stopping when an optimal solution is discovered or 
after a specific number of generations. 
Garvie et al.’s method [22] tolerates permanent faults using jiggling.  Jiggling involves 
repairing a faulty configuration by using an evolutionary algorithm that uses the other 
two healthy modules and fitness feedback from the TMR voting element.  Vigander’s, 
Garvie’s and other n-plex spatial voting approaches [23] deliver real-time fault 
resolution, but increase power consumption and area requirement n-fold during fault-free 
operation.  Previously, these evolutionary approaches have only been simulated using 
hypothetical device models.  They did not attempt application to Commercial Off The 
Shelf (COTS) FPGAs and development tools. 
2.3.1.2. Augmented Genetic Algorithm Repair 
To decrease the amount of time required to generate a repair, Oreifej et al. [24] augment 
Vigander’s Genetic Algorithm fault handling concept with a Combinatorial Group 
Testing (CGT) fault isolation technique.  Group Testing partitions suspect resources into 
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groups and coordinates those groups into a minimal number of tests to isolate the faulty 
resource.  If a group manifests a fault within one of these tests, then the group is known 
to contain the faulty resource and thus the resources within the group are classified as 
suspect.  In a deterministic manner, the suspect resources are partitioned into iteratively 
smaller groups and tested until the faulty resource is isolated. 
A population within a GA contains various configurations, each of which categorizes the 
FPGA resources into two groups: utilized and unutilized resources.  CGT evaluates each 
configuration for correct functionality.  If a configuration manifests a faulty output, then 
the resources used by that configuration are considered suspect.  Since the various 
configurations within the population form groups that overlap particular resources, CGT 
tests multiple configurations and accumulates the number of times each resource is 
considered suspect through a History Matrix.  Configurations are rotated through the 
FPGA and tested until one element becomes the maximum value within the matrix, 
isolating the fault to one resource.  The GA, in turn, uses the fault location information to 
avoid faulty resources while evolving a repaired configuration. 
 
2.3.1.3. Incremental Rerouting Algorithms 
The Node-Covering method discussed in Section 2.2 avoids a fault by rerouting a circuit 
into design-time allocated spares using design-time reserved wire segments.  Dutt et al. 
[1999] expand this method by dynamically allocating reserved wire segments during run-
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time instead of design-time.  Run-time reserved wire segments allow the method to 
utilize unused resources in addition to the spares allocated during design-time. 
Emmert and Bhatia [25] present a similar Incremental Rerouting approach that does not 
require design-time allocated spare resources.  The fault recovery method assumes an 
FPGA to contain resources not utilized by the application, thus exploiting unused fault-
free resources to replace faulty resources.  Upon detecting and diagnosing a logic or 
interconnection fault by some other detection method, Incremental Rerouting calculates 
the new logic netlist to avoid the faulty resource.  The method reads the configuration 
memory to determine the current netlist and implements the incremental changes through 
partial reconfiguration. 
Since faulty cells may not be adjacent to a spare resource, a string of cells is created 
logically, starting with the faulty cell and ending with the logic cell adjacent to the spare 
resource.  To avoid the fault, the string of cells shifts away from the faulty resource and 
towards the spare resource.  In the case of Node-covering, every row has a spare resource 
so the string of cells within the row simply shifts to the right, leaving the faulty resource 
unused.  Since this method does not allocate a spare resource for every row, the string of 
cells may extend into multiple rows to reach a spare cell. 
Re-placing cells requires the wire segments of the moving logic cells to be rerouted.  The 
configuration memory of the FPGA is read to determine which nets are affected by the 
re-placed logic cells.  All faulty nets and those that solely connect the moved logic cells 
are ripped-up [25] while those that connect other unmoved logic cells remain unchanged.  
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A greedy algorithm then incrementally reroutes each of the dual-terminal nets to 
reestablish the application’s original functionality.  Initially, the algorithm only uses 
spare interconnection resources within the direct routing path, but may expand its scope 
to encompass wider routing paths for unroutable nets. 
2.3.2. Online Recovery Methods 
2.3.2.1. TMR with Single-Module Repair 
Since Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) performs the majority vote of three modules, 
the voted output remains correct even if a single module is defective.  Exploiting this 
concept allows a system to remain online with two viable modules while a defective 
module undergoes repair.  Methods presented by Ross and Hall [26], Shanthi et al. [27], 
and Garvie and Thompson [22] repair the defective module through genetic algorithms.   
At design-time, Ross and Hall [26] produce a population of diverse configurations for 
implementation.  At run-time, three of these configurations are implemented into the 
circuit and monitored for discrepancies.  Agreeing outputs indicate that the modules are 
functioning correctly whereas discrepancies indicate defective resources utilized by one 
of the configurations.  A mutation genetic operator is applied to defective modules and 
the fitness of the new individual is evaluated.  The process repeats until the fault is 
occluded. 
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In addition to the strategy above, Shanthi et al. [27] utilize a deterministic approach in 
identifying faulty resources.  By monitoring the resources within each configuration, 
resources utilized by viable modules gain confidence whereas resources utilized by faulty 
modules gain suspicion.  This information allows fault handling by implementing 
configurations not using defective resources.  Additionally, differing configurations can 
be rotated to reveal dormant faults in unused resources. 
Instead of selecting from a diverse population, Garvie and Thompson [22] implement 
three identical modules.  The commonality between configurations permits a Lazy 
Scrubbing technique, which considers the majority vote of the three configurations as the 
original configuration when scrubbing a faulty module.  Of course, Lazy Scrubbing only 
applies when a genetic algorithm has not modified the original configurations to tolerate 
a permanent fault. 
To address permanent faults, a (1+1) Evolutionary Strategy provides a minimal genetic 
algorithm, which produces one genetically modified offspring from one parent and 
chooses the most fit between the two.  To mitigate the possibility for a misevaluated 
offspring replacing a superior parent, a History Window of past mutations is retained to 
enable rollback to the superior individual.  Normal FPGA operational inputs provide the 
test vectors to evaluate the fitness of newly formed individuals.  To determine correct 
values, an individual’s output is compared to the output of the voter.  An individual’s 
fitness evaluation is complete when it has received all possible input combinations. 
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2.3.2.2.   Online Built-in Self Test 
Emmert et al. [28] present an approach that pseudo-exhaustively tests, diagnoses, and 
reconfigures resources of the FPGA to restore lost functionality due to permanent faults.  
The application logic handles transient faults through a concurrent error-detection 
technique and by periodically saving and restoring the system’s state through 
checkpointing.  As shown in [28], this method partitions the FPGA into an Operational 
Area and a Self-Testing ARea (STAR), consisting of a Horizontal STAR and a Vertical 
STAR.  Such an organization allows normal functionality to occur within the Operational 
Area while Built-In Self Tests (BISTs) and fault diagnosis occurs within the STARs.  
Whereas other BIST methods may utilize external testing resources assumed fault-free, 
the resources-under-test also implement the Test-Pattern Generator (TPG) and the Output 
Response Analyzer (ORA). 
To provide fault coverage of the entire FPGA, the STARs incrementally rove across the 
FPGA, each time exchanging its tested resources for the adjacent, untested resources in 
the Operational Area.  The H-STAR roves top to bottom then bottom to top while the V-
STAR roves left to right then right to left.  Whereas one STAR could test and diagnose 
programmable logic blocks (PLBs), two STARs are required to test and diagnose 
programmable interconnect, the H-STAR for horizontal routing resources and the V-
STAR for vertical routing resources.  Where they intersect, the two STARs may 
concurrently test both horizontal and vertical routing resources and the connections 
between them.  Since faults have equal probability to occur within used resources with 
unused resources, Roving STARs provides testing for all resources.  Uncovering dormant 
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faults in unused resources prevents them from being allocated as spares to replace faulty 
operational resources. 
In addition to facilitating testing, diagnosis, and reconfigurations, a Test and 
Reconfiguration Controller (TREC) is responsible for roving the STARs across the 
FPGA.  The TREC is implemented as an embedded or external microprocessor that 
communicates to the FPGA through the Boundary-Scan interface.  All possible 
configurations of the STARs are processed during design-time and stored by the TREC 
for partial reconfiguration during run-time.  Relocating the STARs through partial 
reconfiguration only affects the logic and routing resources within the STAR’s current 
and new locations.  When a STAR’s next location includes sequential logic, the TREC 
pauses the system clock until the logic is completely relocated.  In addition to pausing the 
system clock, the TREC implements an Adaptable System Clock where the clock speed 
is adjusted to account for timing delays arising from new configurations that adapt to 
faults. 
Roving STARs supports a three-level strategy to handling permanent faults.  In the first 
level, a STAR detects a fault and remains in the same position to cover the fault.  Since a 
STAR contains only offline logic and routing resources, testing and diagnosing time is 
not at a premium; the application continues to operate normally while the TREC tests and 
diagnoses the fault.  After diagnosing the fault, the TREC determines if the fault will 
affect the functionality that will soon occupy the faulty resources upon moving the 
STAR.  If the fault will not affect the new configuration’s functionality, such as only 
affecting resources that will be unused or spare, then the application’s output will not 
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articulate the fault and no action is required.  If the fault will affect the new 
configuration’s functionality, then the TREC generates a Fault-Bypassing Roving 
Configuration (FABRIC) to reroute incrementally the new configuration so that the fault 
will not affect its functionality.  Whereas some FABRICs may be compiled during 
design-time, most fault scenarios will dictate compiling them online while the STAR 
covers the fault.  While one STAR covers a fault for testing and diagnosis, the second 
STAR, however, may continue roving the FPGA searching for faults in its respective 
routing resources and PLBs.  The second level strategy then applies the FABRIC that 
either was compiled during design-time or was generated during the first-level strategy.  
Replacing a faulty resource with a spare one through a FABRIC thus releases the STAR 
covering the fault to continue roving the FPGA. 
If the fault affects functionality and no spare resources are available to bypass the fault, 
then the third strategy is invoked.  As a last resort, the TREC has an option to perform 
STAR Stealing, which reallocates resources from a STAR to the Operational Area to 
bypass the fault.  Removing resources from a STAR immobilizes it from roving the 
FPGA.  Whereas the second STAR can test all PLBs in an FPGA with an immobile 
STAR, only half of the routing resources can be tested.  In some situations however, a 
mobile STAR may intersect and forfeit its resources to an immobile STAR, which 
releases the other STAR to rove the FPGA and test the remaining routing resources. 
As previously stated, testing and diagnosis occurs within a STAR.  Utilizing the 
resources of the STAR through partial reconfiguration, the TREC configures a TPG, an 
ORA, and either two Blocks Under Test (BUT) for a PLB test or two Wires Under Test 
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(WUT) for an interconnect test.  Since no resource may be assumed to be fault-free, the 
TPG, BUTs/WUTs, and ORA are rotated through common resources of the STAR.  The 
TREC maintains the results for all test configurations so that the common faulty 
resources can be identified between the two parallel BUTs or WUTs and the rotation of 
resources. 
2.3.2.3. Consensus-based Evaluation of Competing Configurations 
Whereas previous Online Genetic Algorithm-based methods utilize an N-MR voting 
element, the Competitive Runtime Reconfiguration (CRR) approach presented here 
handles faults through a pairwise functional output comparison.  Similar to previous GA 
methods, each of the two individuals is a unique configuration on the target FPGA 
exhibiting the desired functionality.  CRR divides the FPGA into two mutually exclusive 
regions, allocating all Left-Half configurations to one region and Right-Half 
configurations to the other region.  Together, these configurations comprise the 
population of competing alternatives.  The detection method realizes a traditional 
Concurrent Error Detection (CED) arrangement that allocates mutually exclusive 
resources for each individual, which detects any single resource fault.  The comparison 
can result in either a discrepancy or a match between left-half and right-half 
configuration outputs, when resource faults are articulated by the configurations that 
utilize the faulty resources.  Such discrepancies indicate the presence of FPGA resource 
faults in either the resources used to constitute the combinational logic module or a 
pipeline stage consisting of combinational logic. 
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2.4. Fault Detection and Location using Exhaustive Testing Techniques 
Several approaches to GA-based fault handling in FPGAs utilize exhaustive testing for 
fault isolation and offline regeneration mechanisms.  In addition to TMR, Table 2.1 also 
lists characteristics of fault-handling schemes that consider reconfigurability.  TMR, 
Vigander’s, and other n-plex spatial voting approaches deliver real-time fault resolution, 
but increase power consumption n-fold during fault-free operation.  STARS [29] is an 
example of a resource-oriented diagnostic method that performs Built-in Self-Tests 
(BISTs) on sub-sections of the FPGA.  STARS extends the concept of using exhaustive 
testing by exploiting reconfigurability to occlude faults in the circuits.  Under this 
paradigm, the test area roves across all FPGA resources.  Portions of the FPGA are 
continually taken offline in succession for testing while the functionality is moved to a 
new location within the reprogrammable fabric.  The device, however, remains 
operational and hence online.  One limitation is that detection latency can be large since 
tests must sweep through all intervening resources before a fault is detected.  Potential 
throughput unavailability due to diagnostic reconfigurations when no faults have yet 
occurred is also a consideration.  However, STARS is a successful example of a method 
that uses exhaustive online testing to realize regeneration.  Methods proposed by Lohn 
[1]  and Lach [19] either rely on offline regeneration supported by exhaustive functional 
testing, or pre-determined spares defined at design-time. 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Related FPGA Fault-Handling Schemes 
  Fault Detection Resource Coverage Fault Isolation   
Approach Fault Handling Method Latency Distinguish Transients Logic 
Inter- 
connect Comparator Granularity 
TMR Spatial voting Negligible No Yes Yes No Voting element 
Vigander [30] Spatial voting & offline evolutionary regeneration Negligible No Yes No No Voting element 
Lohn et al. [1] Offline evolutionary regeneration Negligible No Yes Yes No Unnecessary 
Lach et al. [19] Static-capability tile reconfiguration Relies on independent fault detection mechanism 
STARs [29] Online BIST Up to 8.5M erroneous outputs 
Test pattern 
transients Yes Yes No LUT function 
Keymeulen[18] Population-based fault insensitive design 
Design-time 
prevention emphasis No Yes Yes No 
Not addressed 
at runtime 
CRR
Competitive runtime input 
fitness evaluation and 
evolutionary regeneration 
Negligible 
Transients are 
attenuated 
automatically
Yes Yes Yes 
Unnecessary, but 
can isolate 
functional 
components 
 
 
Of the methods in Table I, only Keymeulen, Stoica, and Zebulum [18] investigate the 
possibility of using a population-based approach to desensitize circuits to faults.  They 
develop evolutionary techniques so that a circuit is initially designed to remain functional 
even in presence of various faults.  Their population-based fault tolerant design method 
evolves diverse circuits and then selects the most fault-insensitive individual.  In this 
paper we propose a system that achieves improved fault tolerance by using a runtime 
adaptive algorithm that emphasizes the utilization of responses observed during the actual 
operation of the device.  While their population-based fault tolerance approach provides 
passive runtime tolerance, CRR is dynamic and actively improves the fault tolerance of 
the system according to environmental demands. 
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2.5. Forming a Robust Consensus from Diversity 
An evolutionary process that uses absolute fitness measures and exhaustive tests may not 
be able to provide adaptive fault tolerance.  Layzell and Thompson [31] dealt with these 
aspects in terms of Populational Fault Tolerance (PFT) as an inherent quality of 
evolvable hardware.  Under PFT, the creation of the best-fit individual proceeds by 
incrementally incorporating additional elements into partially-correct prototypes to adapt 
to faults.  They speculate that PFT is less likely to occur for online evolution in dynamic 
environments.  Nonetheless, evaluation becomes focused on the precise regions of 
relevance within the search space during the execution of online processes.  This provides 
a powerful motivation to explore CBE. 
Yao and Liu [32] emphasize that in evolutionary systems the population contains more 
information than any one individual.  They demonstrate the utility of information 
contained within the population using case studies from the domains of artificial neural 
networks and rule based systems.  In both cases, the final collection of individuals 
outperforms any single individual.  The work in [33] further extends this concept by 
presenting four methods for combining the different individuals in the final population to 
generate system outputs.  They provide similar results for three data sets, namely the 
Australian credit card assessment problem, the heart disease problem, and the diabetes 
problem.  While the authors devise a method to utilize the information contained in the 
population to improve the final solution, they fail to use the information in the population 
to improve the learning and optimization process itself.  The proposed CBE approach 
indicates that refurbishment problems can benefit from population information.  
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More recently, in [34] the authors describe using fitness sharing and negative correlation 
to create a diverse population of solutions.  A combined solution is then obtained using a 
gating algorithm that ensures the best response to the observed stimuli.  In evolvable 
hardware, it may not always be possible to combine solutions without additional physical 
resources that may also be fault-prone.  In our approach, all individuals in the population 
are recognized as possible solutions, with the best emerging candidate being selected 
based on its runtime performance record.  The authors also claim that applying the 
described techniques to evolvable hardware applications should be straightforward, but 
do not provide examples.  They state the absence of an optimal way of predicting the 
future performance of evolved circuits in unforeseen environments as an impediment.  
Chapter 3 details how an adaptive system can keep track of the relative performances of 
individuals and implicitly build a consensus.  
2.6. Improving Reliability using Autonomous Group Testing 
In state-of-the-art Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs, the device configuration can be modified 
without interrupting the normal operation of the device.  For space applications, it is 
typical to perform such configuration scrubbing periodically to repair any configuration 
errors due to Single Event Upsets (SEUs) [35].  The Xilinx TMR tool software [36] can 
be used to not only triplicate the user's design, but also insert logic to repair transient user 
memory errors and upsets due to SEUs.  TMR can be combined with the scrubbing 
method to have a reliable system while preventing soft errors.  However, configuration 
scrubbing only refreshes a single complete configuration and therefore cannot be used to 
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address permanent faults [37].  While an n-modular redundancy scheme such as TMR 
ensures validated correct output, the proposed AGT-based technique can minimize the 
risk of having two faulty modules.  The comparators of the Xilinx TMR tools can be used 
to detect the discrepancy among the redundant modules.  Discrepancies reported by the 
comparators can be used to target all resources used by a faulty module.  Once the faulty 
module is identified, the GT-based algorithm can localize the fault to a logic slice.  
Autonomous group testing aims to avoid system failure by providing methods to isolate 
permanent faults and maintain a healthy population of configurations for each redundant 
module. 
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CHAPTER 3: COMPETITIVE RUNTIME RECONFIGURATION 
FAULT HANDLING PARADIGM  
While the fault repair capability of Evolvable Hardware (EH) approaches have been 
previously demonstrated, further improvements to fault handling capability can be 
achieved by exploiting population diversity during all phases of the fault handling 
process.  In existing fault-handling methods for reconfigurable hardware, fault-tolerance 
is evolved at design time, or achieved at repair-time using evolution after taking a 
detected failed unit offline.  In both cases, GAs provided a population-based optimization 
algorithm with the objective of producing a single best-fit individual as the final product.  
They rely on a pre-determined static fitness function that does not consider an 
individual's utility relative to the rest of the population.  The evaluation mechanisms used 
in previous approaches depend on the application of exhaustive test vectors to determine 
the individual with the best response to all possible inputs.   
However, given that partially complete repairs are often the best attainable [1], [30], other 
individuals may outperform the best-fit individual over the range of inputs of interest.  In 
particular, there is no guarantee that the individual with the best absolute fitness measure 
for an exhaustive set of test inputs will correspond to the individual within the population 
that has the best performance among individuals under the subset of inputs actually 
applied.  Thus, exhaustive evaluation of regenerated alternatives is computationally 
expensive, yet not necessarily indicative of the optimal performing individual among a 
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population of partially correct repairs.  Hence, two innovations are developed herein for 
sustainable EH regeneration: 
1. Elimination of additional test vectors, and 
2. Temporal Assessment based on aging and outlier identification 
In CRR, an initial population of functionally identical (same input-output behavior), yet 
physically distinct (alternative design or place-and-route realization) FPGA 
configurations is produced at design time.  During runtime, these individuals compete for 
selection based on discrepancy favoring fault-free behavior.  Discrepant behavior, where 
the outputs of two competing individuals do not agree on a bit-by-bit basis, is used as the 
basis for the performance evaluation process.  Any operationally visible fault will 
decrease the fitness of just those configurations that use it.  Over a period of time, as the 
result of successive comparisons, a consensus emerges from the population regarding the 
relative fitness of all individuals.  This allows the classification of configurations into 
ranges of relative reliabilities based on their observed performance during online 
operation. 
3.1. Detecting Faults using a Population of Alternatives 
In order to provide fault coverage for the voting element, a distributed discrepancy 
detector circuit may be used, as described in Section 4.3.  Each individual in the 
population has an instance of one of the two complementary halves of the discrepancy 
detector circuit.  When two competing L and R half-configurations are loaded on the 
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FPGA, the discrepancy detector circuit is completed.  The design of the discrepancy 
detector accounts for the possibility of error in either, or both of the complementary 
halves of the detector.  Such an error would reflect on the performance of the half-
configurations that instantiated the detector hence degrading any preference for selection 
of those individuals as described below.  
`
 Reconfigurable FPGA Device
L 
Half-Configuration
Discrepancy Check L Discrepancy Check R
Function Logic L
            CONFIGURATION  BIT  STREAM
                                                INPUT DATA
Function Logic R
 DATA  OUTPUT
R 
Half-Configuration
 
Figure 3.1: Physical Arrangement with Two Competing Configurations 
3.2. Assessing Individual Fitness and Managing Fitness States 
Instead of using an absolute fitness function with exhaustive testing, outlier identification 
can be achieved using techniques such as the hat matrix [38], H, where the diagonal 
elements Hii are used to identify the threshold to isolate faulty individuals as outliers.  
The threshold value is determined by an analysis of the diagonal elements Hii of the hat 
matrix generated from population statistics accumulated over an evaluation window.  The 
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relative reliability of an individual is indicated by its instantaneous fitness state.  Through 
run-time competition, and the concomitant fitness state assignment, a fault becomes 
occluded from the visibility of subsequent FPGA operations. 
 Health state transitions are managed by the procedural flow for the CRR algorithm as 
depicted in Figure 3.2.  After Initialization, the Selection of the L and R half-
configurations occurs.  The selected individuals are then loaded onto the FPGA.  Next, 
the Detection process is conducted when the normal data processing inputs are applied to 
the FPGA.  The DVs of the competing half-configurations are updated based on whether 
or not their outputs are discrepant.  The central Primary Loop representing discrepancy-
free behavior can repeat without reselection as long as there is no discrepancy.  However, 
even in the absence of any observed discrepancies, one or more of the competing 
individuals may be replaced to hasten regeneration in the presence of Under Repair 
individuals.  As described later, the Replacement Rate, RX, determines the frequency with 
which such discrepancy-free individuals are replaced to allow rotation of other 
individuals from the Dormant pool.  The system availability can be increased by using a 
low value of RX.  
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functionally-identical yet 
physically-distinct
half-configurations
Fitness State
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results
 Calculate the Hii        
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evaluated  >        ?E
YES
NO
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Figure 3.2: Procedural Flow in the CRR Technique 
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The Fitness State Adjustment process will be used to validate and update the state of the 
individual after E evaluations.  Otherwise reselection will occur, without updating the 
fitness state of the individual being replaced.  For Under Repair individuals, if the value 
of the corresponding Hii element is greater than the threshold value then Genetic 
Operators are invoked only once without attempting to achieve complete refurbishment.  
The modified configuration is then immediately returned to the pool of competing 
configurations and the process resumes starting with the Selection phase. 
3.3. Strategic Prioritization of Individuals for Assessment and Refurbishment 
The Selection and Detection processes are shown in Figure 3.3.  During the selection 
process, Pristine, Suspect, and then Refurbished individuals are preferred in that order for 
one half-configuration.  The selection of individuals based on the relative fitness ensures 
the lowest possible probability of two half-configurations agreeing by producing the 
same incorrect outputs.  The other half-configuration is selected based on a stochastic 
process determined by the Re-introduction Rate (λR).  In particular, Under Repair 
individuals are selected as one of the competing half-configurations on average at a rate 
equal to λR.  Thus, a genetically-modified Under Repair configuration is re-introduced at 
a controlled rate into the operational throughput flow.  They act as a new competitor to 
potentially exhibit fault-free behavior against the larger pool of configurations.  An 
additional innovation is that λR can also be adapted to encourage Mean-Time-To-Repair 
(MTTR) << Mean-Time-Between-Failures (MTBF) to refurbish the population at a rate 
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not less than new failures are occurring.  Maintaining this inequality realizes sustainable 
fault-handling under fully autonomous operation. 
The Detection process is presented in the lower right corner of Figure 3.3.  If a 
discrepancy is observed as a result of output comparison, the FPGA is reconfigured with 
a different pair of competing configurations and the output of the device need not be 
propagated to allow recalculation.  The evaluation mechanisms used in previous 
approaches depend on exhaustive test vectors.  They also utilize a pre-determined fitness 
evaluation scheme to determine the individual with the best response to all possible 
inputs.  Other partially repaired individuals may outperform the best-fit individual for the 
runtime input vectors.  CRR overcomes these issues by using the runtime inputs as the 
test vector, and the output of the discrepancy detector to detect faults and provide 
information for the subsequent isolation of outliers as described in Section 4.2.  Also, the 
partially correct outputs generated by competing fault-affected individuals can improve 
availability as opposed to keeping a device completely offline while a perfect solution is 
being obtained.  
In order to isolate and detect faulty individuals in a timely manner, all the individuals in 
the population should have an equally likely probability of being selected as the Active 
individuals with a suitable interval between successive selections.  The Replacement 
Rate, RX, is used to monitor this rotation of individuals onboard the FPGA device, 
including the individuals not Under Repair.  
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Figure 3.3: Selection and Detection in the CRR Paradigm 
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3.4. Determination of Evaluation Window 
CRR uses runtime-inputs for individual performance evaluation rather than exhaustive 
testing with a predefined set of test vectors.  Nonetheless, pseudo-exhaustive testing on 
an individual basis provides adequate test coverage.  While the range and sequence of the 
online inputs may not be known at design-time, a probabilistic model is useful to estimate 
the expected number of evaluations required to encounter a sufficient range of values 
with high probability.  The Evaluation Window, E, is selected accordingly.  It regulates 
the update frequency of each individual’s relative fitness based on DVi values during the 
interval.     
The characteristics of the circuit under repair influence the determination of E as 
illustrated for an unsigned integer multiplier.  Let the circuit input width, W, denote the 
total number of operand bits to the multiplier.  In the case of a 3-bit×3-bit multiplier, W = 
6 and the total number of distinct input combinations is 2W = 64.  Thus in the case of the 
3-bit×3-bit multiplier, an exhaustive set of inputs would consist of all 64 possible 
combinations.  The problem of determining the number of random inputs needed to 
facilitate all possible inputs appearing at least once is similar to the coupon collector 
problem [39].  In the coupon collector problem, the expected number of coupons to be 
collected before at least one each of D total coupons are collected is given by the 
simplified expression, D × HD, where HD is the Dth harmonic sum.  However, for the 
exhaustive test modeling problem at hand, the number of random inputs required to 
facilitate the appearance of all possible inputs with varying confidence factors needs to be 
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derived.  This problem can be modeled as a game involving selection of balls from a set 
of 64 differently colored balls.  A single ball is selected in each drawing, with 
replacement.  In other words, what is the probability that, after D drawings, at least one 
ball of each of the 64 colors appeared at least once?  Clearly, for D < 64, the probability 
is zero, and for D = 64 is 2.54×10-116 which is highly improbable. 
To solve this problem, consider the case where all balls are of one color.  After D 
drawings, we have  where D
1⎞⎛ x 1
1 1
=⎟⎟⎠⎜
⎜
⎝ 1
x  is the number of feasible sample events, 
so .  Now, consider the case when D≥64.  In general, a K-color experiment can be 
described as a sum of experiments involving smaller numbers of colors for any constant 
value of D: 
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Since the numerical value of DK  in Equation (4.2)  can be excessively large, it may not 
be possible to represent it using an unsigned long variable, the widest variable in a 32-bit 
system, since for example .  Therefore, an alternate representation can 
consider as a sample event in which all K colored balls appear at least once with a 
1232 −
Kx
6464 >
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probability .  D is the number of drawings, and KP
DK  is the total number of possible 
permutations, yielding: 
  D  (4.3) KK KxP /=
Now, by dividing Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) by KD, we obtain respectively, 
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Equation (4.9)  yields  recursively without the computational burden of calculating KP
DK  as < 1 for all K. ( KK /)1( − )
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Figure 3.4: Effect of Sample Size on Test Coverage 
As shown in Figure 3.4, when K=16 colors and D=100 drawings, the probability of all 
16 colors appearing is ≈ 100%.  Similarly, 250 trials for 32 colors are sufficient given 
equi-probable inputs.  
16P
Table 3.1 shows the result for the case when K=64, which applies 
to the 3-bit×3-bit multiplier.  In order to achieve comprehensive coverage with a certainty 
of 97.59%, approximately 500 evaluations are sufficient.  A certainty of 99.50% implies 
an evaluation window of width E=600 which was adopted for the fault isolation 
experiments in Section 3.6.  Thus, in the case of a 3-bit×3-bit multiplier design, if 1-out-
of-64 inputs articulate a fault in a single individual Ci, and all the input combinations are 
equally likely to appear, then the expected discrepancy value after E = 600 evaluations is: 
 375.9
64
1 =×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= EDVi  (4.10) 
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Table 3.1: Probability of all 64 Inputs Appearing At Least Once given D Evaluations 
 D=350 D=400 D=450 D=500 D=550 D=600 D=650 
P64 76.96% 88.84% 94.77% 97.59% 99.00% 99.50% 99.77%
3.5. Identifying Outliers using the Sliding Window Technique 
From a statistical perspective, the residuals, expressed as the difference between the 
expected fault-free behavior and the observed circuit response, of the faulty individuals 
are significantly larger than the fault-free individuals when using the Least Squares (LS) 
method [38].  However, the LS method is most effective when exactly one outlying 
element is expected.  In the case of multiple outliers being detected in one Sliding 
Window, the mean and the standard deviation alone may not aid in detecting the multiple 
outliers leading to a loss in isolation capacity.  Also, to increase the confidence with 
which outliers are isolated, we increase threshold from one standard deviation from the 
mean to a value of 2.5σ.  Under these circumstances, a simple method such as the LS 
method is not directly applicable.   
Another class of outlier diagnostics is based on the principle of detecting the outlier by 
the LS projection matrix H.  This matrix is well known under the name hat matrix, 
because it is denoted by a hat on the column vector y = (y1,…, yn)t such that ŷ=H*y and ŷ 
is the LS prediction for y.  The hat matrix H is defined as follows: consider there are p 
explanatory variables and one response variable which will have n observations.  The n-
by-1 vector of responses is denoted by y=(y1,…, yn)t.  The linear model states that 
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y=X×θ+e, where θ is the vector of unknown parameters, e is the error vector and X is the 
n-by-p matrix: 
  (4.11) 
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Then, the H matrix is composed from X as follows: 
  (4.12) t1t X)XX(XH −=
The diagonal elements of H have a direct interpretation as the effect exerted by the ith 
observation on the expectation of response variable because they equal .  The 
average value of the diagonal element Hii is p/n and it follows that 0 for all i.   
ii y/y ∂∂
1≤
∧
≤ iiH
In the CRR approach, the DV of each individual can be viewed as one observation or one 
explanatory variable, and the Observation Interval can be set as the size of the entire 
population.  Fortunately, since the X matrix consists of only one column in our 
application, the result of the XtX product is a single-element vector matrix, and its inverse 
can be computed using a straightforward one-step computation.  In general, the 
computation complexity of the H matrix approach is 2n2+1. 
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The recommended threshold for the identification of outliers is Hii > 2p/n and a stricter 
cut-off value 3p/n has been used in previous works [40] [41].  For an analysis of the CRR 
problem for fault isolation, setting p = 1 and n = 20 corresponds to one faulty individual 
among a population of 20.  For example, a cut-off value of 10×
n
p  = 
20
10  = 0.5 can be 
used in conjunction with a larger Sliding window width of 15 to ensure consistent outlier 
identification with 100% certainty. 
3.6. Outlier Detection and Fault Isolation Performance with Runtime Inputs 
Experimental results regarding the effect of the outlier detection parameters are 
illustrated in Figure 3.5 through Figure 13.  Each has been generated using a simulator 
written in the C++ programming language which utilizes an equi-probable selection of 
individuals.  In the data reported for experiments, the inputs causing the first discrepancy 
are applied once after each pair of faulty configurations is replaced to assess damage 
definitively under the single-fault model.   
To further illustrate how the DVs are mapped to the Hii values, Figure 3.5 through Figure 
13 are presented in pairs that show results from the same experiment.  The first Figure in 
each pair shows the observed DVs and the subsequent Figure shows the Hii values 
calculated using this data.  Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 depict the identification of outlying 
individuals in the population that has a 10-out-of-64 fault impact caused by a single fault.  
For example, Figure 3.5 shows the DVs observed over 50 individual evaluations, where 
each evaluation occurs after the particular individual has completed E=600 computations 
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as an Active configuration on the simulated FPGA.  This corresponds to one individual 
completing a number of computations equal to E.  From Figure 3.5, an outlier is 
identified when ten individuals have completed E iterations.  
A sliding window width of 15 was used in this experiment.  Based on analysis of the Hii 
values, and an outlier cut-off value of 0.5, the outlying individual is identified without 
statistically significant error.  As shown in Figure 3.5, outliers can be identified with a 
regular periodicity.  Figure 3.6 shows the plot of Hii values for a subset of evaluations 
corresponding to the identification of the first outlier in Figure 3.5.  Figure 3.6 also shows 
that the outlier in the population exhibits Hii ≈ 0.94 which is over an order of magnitude 
larger than Hii ≈ 0.02 of the other competitors.  Also, the Hii values of the non-outlying 
elements conform to a very narrow window of values, clearly demonstrating that the 
penalty for discrepant observations are amortized among the non-defective members of 
the population.  In Figure 3.5, it can be clearly seen that the first outlier is identified after 
11×E = 6600 computations.  This period, after which the outlier is detected can be 
lowered by reducing the sliding window.  By choosing a lower value for the sliding 
window, outlier identification will take place at an increased frequency as shown in 
subsequent experiments. 
In Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, individual performance was measured using a simple 
Winner-Takes-All scheme, where the only information available from the discrepancy 
detection is bit-wise output equality.  A different discrepancy detection mechanism could 
provide information such as the Hamming distance of the observed output of an 
individual from the desired output. 
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 Figure 3.5: Discrepancy Values Observed  
when One Individual has a 10-out-of-64 Fault Impact 
 
Figure 3.6: Plot of Hii Showing Outlier Identification 
 50
The use of Hamming distance information leads to outliers having a higher discrepancy 
value, as shown in Figure 3.7, when compared to Figure 3.5.  As in the previous 
experiment, a 10-out-of-64 fault impact is considered, with a sliding window width of 15.  
The higher DV of approximately 140 can be accounted for by the fact that the observed 
Hamming distance between the observed discrepant output and the desired ideal can be 
greater than 1.  This is opposed to the previous case, where the presence of a discrepancy 
increases the DV of the corresponding individuals by one yielding DV≈70.  The outlier 
threshold remains the same, nonetheless, since the hat matrix operates on normalized 
information.  Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show plots of the Discrepancy Value and the H 
values when the Hamming distance is used to quantify divergence.  
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
D
is
cr
ep
an
cy
 V
al
ue
Number of individual evaluations
 Non-Outlier
 Outlier
Sliding Window=15
Fault Impact =10/64
 
Figure 3.7: Discrepancy Values Observed When Hamming Distance is Used 
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Figure 3.8: Plot of Hii Showing Outlier 
 Identification When Hamming Distance is Used 
In the case when a single faulty L individual with a less catastrophic 1-out-of-64 fault 
impact is analyzed, two outlier points are successfully isolated as shown in the Figure 
3.9.  Figure 3.10 shows the corresponding plot of the Hii for the same experiment.  The 
detection rate is 100% for this scenario.  When compared to the results in Figure 3.5 and 
Figure 3.6, it can be seen that the identification takes place more frequently with a 
periodicity of approximately 5×E.  This corresponds to the use of a narrower sliding 
window width as opposed to the 15×E used in the earlier experiment.  In Figure 3.9, the 
outlier cut-off value is 0.3 as compared to 0.5 in Figure 3.6.  Also, the first outlier in 
Figure 3.10 is closer to the cut-off value which can be expected with a narrow sliding 
window.  A wider sliding window width helps reinforce identification, yet too large a 
value can delay identification without improving the discrimination among faulty and 
viable competitors. 
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Figure 3.9: DV of a Single Faulty L Individual With a 1-out-of-64 Fault Impact 
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Figure 3.10: Isolation of a Single Faulty L Individual With a 1-out-of-64 Fault Impact 
For a greater fault impact, the isolation will be more challenging and time-consuming as 
shown in Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12.  Both Figures depict the isolation characteristics 
for a single faulty L individual with a 32-out-of-64 fault impact.  A greater number of 
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observations are required than the 1-out-of-64 scenario and the divergence of the outlier 
is also greater.  Individuals that are eventually identified as outliers are replaced more 
often, since the computations involving these individuals produce discrepant outputs.  
Under the default replacement strategy for discrepancy-free behavior depicted in Figure 
3.3, fault-free individuals reside on the FPGA indefinitely.  However, in this experiment, 
they are replaced in accordance with the Replacement Rate RX=0.16, which corresponds 
to a guaranteed evaluation period of 100 contiguous iterations out of the E=600 window.  
Individuals that do not produce discrepant outputs are replaced with other individuals less 
frequently than ones that do.  Thus, individuals that are not fault-affected complete the 
required E number of iterations to complete evaluation much sooner than the fault-
affected individuals.  This is because discrepancies trigger immediate reconfiguration as a 
means of maintaining throughput and improving system availability. 
 
Figure 3.11: DVs Observed When a Single  
Faulty Individual has a 32-out-of-64 Fault Impact 
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 Figure 3.12: Isolation of a Single Faulty L Individual with a 32-out-of-64 fault Impact 
3.7. Feed-Forward FPGA Circuit Representation Model 
The FPGA structure used in the following experiments is similar to that used by Miller 
and Thompson for GA-based arithmetic circuit design [42].  The feed-forward 
combinational logic circuit uses a rectangular array of nodes with two inputs and one 
output.  Each node represents a Look-up Table (LUT) in the FPGA device, and a 
Configurable Logic Block (CLB) is composed of four LUTs.  In the array, each CLB will 
be a row of the array and two LUTs are represented as four columns of the array.  There 
are five dyadic functions – OR, AND, XOR, NOR, NAND – and one unary-function 
NOT, each of which can be assigned to an LUT.  The LUTs in the CLB array are indexed 
linearly from 1 to n.  Array routing is defined by the internal connectivity and the 
inputs/outputs of the array.  Internal connectivity is specified by the connections between 
the array cells.  The inputs of the cells can only be the outputs of cells with lower row 
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numbers.  Thus, the linear labeling and connection restrictions impose a feed-forward 
structure on the combinational circuit. 
As an example of the circuit representation, the 3-bit×3-bit multiplier can be 
implemented using the above FPGA structure, as shown in Figure 3.13.  The entire 
configuration utilizes 21 CLBs.  XOR gates are excluded from the initial designs to force 
usage of a higher number of the gates than conventional multiplier designs to increase the 
design space.  XOR gates simplify the process of calculating partial binary sums, and 
thus reduce the number of gates required to build half-adders and full-adders. 
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Figure 3.13: Example of a 3-bit×3-bit Multiplier Design 
A library of user-defined modules can be defined to instantiate a population of diverse yet 
functionally-equivalent circuits.  In this case study, 20 distinct individuals are created at 
design-time using a set of 10 or more variations of three fundamental sub-circuits.  These 
consist of parallel-AND, half-adder, and full-adder primitives.  For example, 24 different 
 56
full-adder designs and 18 different half-adder designs were created for use in building the 
individual 3-bit×3-bit multiplier designs.  Thus, each multiplier is a distinct combination 
of building blocks, where each building block itself is chosen from among alternate 
designs in the library.  Figure 3.13 illustrates an individual with 3 parallel-AND, 3 full-
adder, and 6 half-adder modules.  
The population of competing alternatives is then divided into two groups, L and R, where 
each group uses an exclusive set of physical resources.  For crossover to occur such that 
offspring are guaranteed to utilize only mutually-exclusive physical resources with other 
resident half-configurations, a two-point crossover operation is carried out with another 
randomly selected Pristine, Suspect or Refurbished individual belonging to the same 
group.  By enforcing speciation, breeding occurs exclusively within L or R, and non-
interfering resource use is maintained.  The crossover points are chosen along the 
boundary of CLBs so that intra-CLB crossover is precluded.  The mutation operator 
randomly changes the LUT’s functionality or reconnects one input of the LUT to a new, 
randomly selected output inside the CLB. 
3.8. Refurbishment of a Unique Failed Configuration – 3-bit×3-bit Multiplier 
Case Study 
In this experiment, GA-based recovery operators are applied to regenerate the 
functionality in the affected individuals.  In order to simulate a hardware fault in the 
FPGA, a single stuck-at fault is inserted at a randomly-chosen LUT input pin.  This fault 
will affect the L individuals in the population.  Similar faults are later introduced into the 
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R individuals.  Upon observing the first discrepancy, the same inputs are applied once to 
the reloaded configurations as a definitive means of damage assessment under a single-
fault model.  Over 25 experimental runs, an average of 2,171 iterations were required to 
dependably demote the fitness state of the affected individual from Pristine to Under 
Repair.  During regeneration, the genetic algorithm performs inter-module crossover and 
intra-module mutation operator called the input permutation operator.  Unlike traditional 
mutation, the input permutation operator alters a specific LUT’s functionality, choosing 
from among AND, OR, XOR, NOR and NAND gates, as also changing the connections 
to the input pins.  Such mutation in conjunction with the crossover operator enables full 
exploration of a wide range of designs.   
Table 3.2 lists the evolutionary regeneration characteristics of CRR for stuck-at-0 and 
stuck-at-1 faults.  The faults were injected at randomly chosen locations in the designs.  
For the experiment, DVR DVO, the repair and operational thresholds, were 2.5σ and 1σ 
respectively.  The use of multiples of standard deviation as the threshold ensures that the 
system adapts in the case of catastrophic fault conditions, as well as the condition where 
very few discrepancies are observed.  The parameters which control the rate at which 
individuals are rotated on the FPGA, λR and RX were set at 0.2 and 0.16, respectively.  
The reintroduction rate of 0.2 implies that 20% of the computations were carried out 
using a pair of individuals, one of which was Under Repair.  In spite of this, the effective 
throughput remains high and above 97.5% on an average.  This shows that individuals 
undergoing repair produce useful output approximately 0.975-(1-λR)/λR×100%=87.5% of 
the time. 
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Table 3.2: Regeneration Characteristics for a Single Fault under CBE 
Exp. 
Number Fault Location 
Failure 
Type 
 
Correctness 
after 
Fault 
 
Total 
Iterations
 Discrepant 
Iterations 
Repair 
Iterations 
Final 
Correctness 
Throughput 
(%)   
1 CLB3,LUT0,Input1 Stuck-at-1 52 / 64 1.7 × 107 4.2 × 105 1194 64 / 64 97.7 
2 CLB6,LUT0,Input1 Stuck-at-0 33 / 64 8.0 × 105 1.7 × 104 47 64 / 64 97.9 
3 CLB5,LUT2,Input0 Stuck-at-1 22 / 64 3.1 × 106 6.8 × 104 193 64 / 64 97.8 
4 CLB7,LUT2,Input0 Stuck-at-0 38 / 64 8.1 × 106 1.8 × 105 513 64 / 64 97.7 
5 CLB9,LUT0,Input1 Stuck-at-0 40 / 64 2.3 × 106 7.1 × 104 219 64 / 64 96.9 
   Average 32.6 / 64 6.4 × 106 1.5 × 105 433 64 / 64 97.6 
Using a higher value for λR will lead to faster regeneration at an incremental cost to repair 
throughput.  This provides a great deal of adaptability and fine-grained control over 
system performance measured in terms of availability and regeneration latency.  Unlike 
other circuit design and regeneration approaches, CRR can be optimized to reduce 
downtime, increase availability, or to speed up the fault identification and regeneration 
process.  The results listed in Table 3.2 indicate that the evolutionary algorithm is capable 
of regeneration for the tested fault locations.  The correctness of the affected 
configurations is raised from as low as 22-out-of-64 correctness to complete operational 
suitability.  The effective throughput is maintained throughout at above 97.6%.  It can 
also be seen that CRR-based regeneration can be more computational tractable without 
exhaustive evaluation, as is listed in the Repair Iterations column. 
In Vigander’s experiment with using a voting system in conjunction with TMR [30], the 
target circuit is a 4-bit×4-bit multiplier.  With a population size of 50, and a crossover 
rate of 70%, most of the 44 runs developed a set of three modules which vote to provide 
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fully-fit output for the exhaustive set of 256 unique input combinations.  However, it is 
not always able to identify a single fully repaired individual.  Vigander’s experiment has 
a population size of 50, which is 500% greater than the population in the repair 
experiments attempted herein.  Most significantly, it relies on exhaustive serial testing 
against the set of all possible inputs.  CRR, however, achieves refurbishment with 
runtime inputs, continually providing some validated outputs that maintains useful 
throughput above 85%.  Compared to Jiggling [22], which is a similar evolutionary-
algorithm based approach to repairing permanent faults, CRR has lower latency by virtue 
of not relying on exhaustive tracking of the repair candidates.  Additionally, the (1+1) 
Evolutionary System described therein relies on rollbacks to preserve best-fit mutants.  
CRR, by virtue of depending on a population of higher-fit alternatives that are evaluated 
temporally over many iterations, precludes the need for rollback of configurations and 
ensures higher populational fault tolerance capability.  Significantly, as opposed to the 
work of Keymeulen in populational fault tolerance [18], CRR achieves device 
refurbishment at runtime, while ensuring sustainable levels of throughput with graceful 
degradation.  As compared to the Roving STARs approach [29], CRR minimizes 
detection latency, as faults are evident immediately upon a discrepancy at the outputs.  
Also, unlike STARs, by virtue of the runtime-input based performance evaluation, CRR 
leverages partially-fit configurations to provide some functional throughput.  This 
effectively improves the granularity of spare usage to include those affected by stuck-at 
faults, as the GA may evolve solutions that use fault-affected resources in generating 
repair configurations. 
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In Summary of the Repair experiments, evolutionary regeneration addresses a problem 
domain that is distinct from evolutionary design.  Namely, regeneration can benefit from 
a population of partially working designs which provide diverse, relevant alternates.  This 
also allows departure from conventional fitness evaluation with a rigid individual-centric 
fitness measure defined at design-time.  CRR uses instead, a self-adapting, population-
centric assessment method at runtime.  CRR relies on the consensus observed among a 
group of individuals to evolve and adapt fitness criteria for individual members, thus 
providing graceful degradation.  By utilizing outlier detection techniques that work 
temporally without the need for exhaustive testing, CRR provides a fault tolerance 
technique that maximizes device throughput during the fault detection process.   
  While the pre-existing methods focus on creating a single fully-fit configuration, CRR 
extends this to maintain a population of solutions that have a higher average fitness.  This 
ensures the adaptability of the population of viable alternatives to a variety of 
unanticipated faults.  An additional benefit of maintaining a population of diverse 
partially-fit individuals is that when the inputs to the system are localized to a subset of 
the set of all possible inputs, even partially-fit individuals can assist in generating 
expected outputs, thereby improving the rate of viable throughput during recovery.  
Population-centric assessment methods such as CRR can provide an additional degree of 
adaptability and autonomy to fault-handling in reconfigurable devices.  The demonstrated 
potential of such population-centric methods can be further enhanced as follows, and as 
further explored in the subsequent chapters.  After discrepancy detection, a CGT method 
which tracks utilization of resource sets among individuals in the population, is used to 
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identify the stage containing the faulty resource.  This is readily incorporated within the 
configuration selection step of CRR.  The genetic operators are then applied only to that 
isolated stage to attempt recovery, thus providing an approach to extend the CRR method 
to larger circuits while remaining computationally tractable. 
In order to accelerate the fault recovery process, a fault detection and isolation method 
that functions on the run-time inputs is required.  Further, the method has to operate on 
the basis of comparisons between two functional configurations’ performance.  In the 
next chapter, a discrepancy-enabled dueling scheme is presented that enable fast fault 
detection.   
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CHAPTER 4: FAULT ISOLATION USING GROUP TESTING 
A fault detection and isolation method for stuck-at logic faults in FPGAs is developed 
starting from a simple reconfigurable device model.  A discrepancy detector is realized 
and implemented in CMOS to demonstrate the viability of the approach.  Starting from a 
fully-articulating fault model, a general outline for discrepancy-enabled group testing is 
generated and expanded to the a partially-articulating fault model.  Finally, examples of 
adapting group testing techniques to improve the performance of GAs and also for 
exhaustive BIST-based techniques are presented. 
4.1. Motivating Example and Problem Definition 
In order to better understand the group testing problem at hand, consider an analogy 
termed the Treasurer's Problem which is related to the Counterfeit Coin Problem [43].  
The Counterfeit Coin Problem is extended here by analogy to support arbitrary groupings 
of logic cells within FPGAs.  In this Treasurer’s Problem, legitimate coins are made of 
gold, with the face value of the coins being proportional to their weight.  However, some 
counterfeit coins have other metals mixed in with the gold, and these counterfeit coins are 
to be identified and removed.  The weight of an impure coin is different from the weight 
of pure coins of the same denomination.  The treasurer must inspect large quantities of 
coins for authenticity.  Most significantly, since the number of counterfeit instances is 
small relative to the total number of coins present, the treasurer does not weigh the coins 
individually.  Instead the coins are in a vat, and the treasurer retreives coins from the vat 
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to fill bags containing exactly 100 monetary units worth of coins.  The number of coins in 
each bag may vary because of their multiple denominations, yet due to the property that 
their mass is proportional to their denomination then only two equally-valued legitimate 
bags will display equal weight.   
Using a pan balance, the treasurer compares the weight of two bags at a time to determine 
whether they are equal weight or not.  The coins from the bags may be returned to the vat 
after weighing, so that they can be filled in other bags later after shuffling.  Given these 
pre-conditions, a number of questions arise about how the treasurer will identify any 
faulty coinage such as: How many weighings will the treasurer need to identify bags 
containing the impure coins?  Can the impure coin be identified, if there was only one?  
These questions are analagous to the problems addressed in this paper for identification 
of a faulty physical resource used by a functional arrangement of FPGA configurations.   
FPGA devices are composed of an array of logic resources such as LUTs that are utilized 
by functional configurations just as the coins are grouped into a bag for weighing.  A 
digital design can be mapped onto the resources on an FPGA in several ways, just like a 
bag worth 100 monetary units can be filled with coins of different denominations in 
several different ways.  When one of the resources used by a configuration is faulty, the 
output of the configuration in response to an input may be faulty.  Identifying the faulty 
resource from among many fault free resources, without testing the resources individually 
is a challenging task.   Exhaustive testing of the individual resources is time consuming 
which takes the device offline and reduces its availability.  By analogy, if the coins were 
weighed and checked individually, the time required would be phenomenal to locate a 
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single faulty coin out of thousands of coins.  Instead, we re-cast the problem of 
identifying the faulty resource into one of making choices for group comparison from 
among the given FPGA configurations. 
4.2. Fault Isolation by Discrepancy-Enabled Repetitive pairing 
Robust fault detection is central to the problem of enhancing the fault-handling 
capabilities of digital circuits.  A common limitation facing many fault detection schemes 
is that the failure detector itself may fail.  A fault involving the checker may be 
undetectable or result in the corruption of otherwise valid outputs.  Traditional 
approaches to fault-detection typically rely on coding-based schemes or redundancy 
using a single voter, comparator, or error detector.  Those fault checkers possess a single 
point-of-failure exposure involving the detector elements, or must rely upon special test-
vectors or data encodings to isolate them.  Detector components in the reliability path 
have been referred to as golden elements [22] because the fault-handling strategy relies 
on them to be fault-free.  The following sections develop an alternative approach to self-
checking fault detection based on random pairings and temporal voting to reduce such 
exposures. 
Table 4.1: Comparison of Fault-Detection Techniques 
 
Table 4.1 lists characteristics of selected fault-handling strategies.  Specialized encoding 
schemes are often required by CED approaches as opposed to TMR and the Discrepancy 
Mirror methods which do not.  The number of functional logic elements required by 
TMR is greater than that of the other schemes.  Discrepancy Mirrors provide inherent 
transient fault coverage with minimal detection latency.  They also support fine-grained 
resolution of the fault location, without interruption to the data throughput flow when a 
fault occurs.  Thus, Discrepancy Mirrors offer improved detection of permanent and 
transient faults, with reduced time and space overheads.  Section 4.3 provides the design 
of the discrepancy mirror approach.  Results of simulations and fault location 
experiments conducted in the case study are given in Section 4.4. 
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4.3. Designing a Discrepancy Mirror – Case Study 
The Discrepancy Mirror approach is a duplex redundancy technique that utilizes alternate 
physical configurations from a population of candidate designs that are functionally 
equivalent.  As shown in Figure 4.1, the technique is composed of three phases, namely 
Selection, Detection, and Preference Adjustment.  The Selection phase selects two 
candidates, each of which utilize mutually exclusive subsets of the resources under test.  
The Detection process uses the Discrepancy Mirror logic shown in Figure 4.2 to check 
for bit-wise equivalence between outputs of the candidates as described below.  The 
Preference Adjustment phase utilizes the results of successive comparisons to update the 
pairing strategy during subsequent selections.  These steps will be explained below in the 
context of a FPGA-based realization whereby two configurations of the functional logic 
are loaded in tandem. 
 
Figure 4.1: Discrepancy Mirror-based Scheme 
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 Figure 4.2: Discrepancy Detection Circuit 
4.3.1. Selection Phase 
Candidate designs are selected from a population developed at design time, either 
manually or via a CAD tool.  Random pairings or an adaptive scheme based on the 
results of Preference Adjustment can be employed.  This process is identified as Step 1 in 
Figure 4.1.  The selected designs are then loaded as the active configurations during Step 
2 and Step 3.  Identical input operands are applied in parallel to each configuration and 
the outputs are redundantly computed for comparison in the next phase. 
4.3.2. Detection Phase 
As shown in Step 4 in Figure 4.1, the discrepancy mirror circuit is used to identify 
whether the outputs of the two configurations under test agree.  A complete instance of 
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the discrepancy mirror is obtained whenever two configurations are loaded, since the 
discrepancy detector consists of two identical sections as shown in Figure 4.2.  Assertion 
of MATCH output from the discrepancy mirror indicates the absence of a single-fault in 
the configurations under test, as well as the logic in the discrepancy mirror.  The data 
output is enabled if and only if no faults are detected as shown in Step 5 in Figure 4.1. 
The inputs to the Discrepancy Mirror shown in Figure 4.2 as “Function Output A” and 
“Function Output B” are generated independently.  If there is a fault in a resource utilized 
by either of these configurations, then a discrepancy is observed at the output.  The truth 
table shown in Table 2 describes the operation of the circuit shown in Figure 4.2.  
Outputs from the function configurations A and B are applied as inputs to both the 
XNOR gates.  The output from each XNOR gate acts as the ENABLE signal for the tri-
state buffer in the same half, as well as the input to the tri-state buffer in the other half of 
the discrepancy mirror.  The tri-state buffer outputs are tied together to form a Wired-OR 
connection which provides the MATCH output signal.  The pull-down transistors hold 
the signal to a logic ‘0’ level when the tri-state buffer output is in a high-impedance state.  
In an active-high non-inverting tri-state buffer, the input is buffered at the output only 
when the ENABLE signal is high.  When the ENABLE signal is low, the output of the 
buffer is in a high-impedance state.  
A CMOS model of the discrepancy detector was created using PSpice.  The circuit was 
constructed using 44 p- and n-channel MOS transistors with a 1.5 micron minimum 
width, and a 600nm length.  The width of the p-mos transistors was set to thrice the width 
of the n-mos transistors.  Figure 4.3 below shows the PSpice schematic and Figure 4.4 
 69
shows the transient response of the circuit demonstrating that the circuit conforms to 
specifications enabling the correct identification of discrepancies.  Subsequently, the 
circuit was also simulated on the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA using the ModelSim-II 
simulator. 
 
Figure 4.3 Discrepancy Detector Circuit Schematic Layout 
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 Figure 4.4  Transient Response of the CMOS Discrepancy Detector Circuit 
As listed in Table 4.2, the response of the circuit is robust to several possible fault 
scenarios.  If either of the XNOR gates fail, then one of the two tri-state buffers will be 
disabled and the other will have an input of zero, thus MATCH will be a ‘0’, signifying 
discrepancy.  If the tri-state buffers fail, producing a high impedance output, the pull 
down resistors in the circuit will hold the signal to ‘0’.  The wired-OR connection reduces 
single points of failure to a stuck-at fault exposure for the MATCH output. 
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Table 4.2: Discrepancy Mirror Truth Table 
 
4.3.3. The Preference Adjustment Process 
Step 6 and Step 7 comprise the Preference Adjustment process.  When the Discrepancy 
Mirror returns a MATCH output, alternate configurations can be loaded for testing or the 
resident fault-free configurations can be used.  The output from the discrepancy mirror 
over a period of time indicates the relative fitness of the different configurations.  This 
information can isolate the fault location and aid in regeneration of lost functionality 
through the identification of alternate resources.  The cumulative discrepancy information 
from diverse pairings over time can be used in Step 7 to modify the selection preferences 
for the configurations in the population. 
4.4. Analysis of Fault Isolation with a Simplified Articulation Model 
The operation of the discrepancy mirror circuit was verified on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 
FPGA platform using ModelSim-II.  The pull-down resistors were emulated using digital 
components as shown in the Xilinx data sheet [44].  The waveform for the MATCH 
output was asserted whenever the inputs to the discrepancy mirror were in agreement.  
The simulation waveform showed a LOW signal whenever the MATCH output was a ‘0’.  
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In the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA, when pull-down resistors are emulated, a LOW signal 
is the equivalent of a logic-0 output.  The circuit was also simulated using Cadence 
SPICE.  The entire circuit was also realized using a total of 44 p- and n-channel MOS 
transistors using a 1.5 micron minimum width technology with a length of 600 nm.  A 
total of 44 CMOS transistors were utilized to realize the circuit.  The widths of the pMOS 
transistors in the XNOR circuit were selected to be thrice the widths of the nMOS 
transistors to shape the waveform rise and fall times, to develop the required timing 
characteristics.  The simulation results and waveforms obtained indicated behavior 
conforming to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Discrepancy Mirror Fault Coverage and Response 
 
Two sets of experiments were performed to analyze the fault isolation latency.  Both 
experiments sought identify the number of iterations required to identify the faulty 
resource in the case of single fault.  A simulator was constructed using a C-language 
program for simulating the Selection, Detection, and Preference Adjustment phases.  The 
inputs to the simulated mirror were obtained using random number generators.  Random 
input values were applied to two configurations chosen at random from the pool of 
competing configurations.  More formally, let U denote the set consisting of all the logic 
resources in the FPGA, S denote the pool of resources suspected of being faulty, and 
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Ci ⊂ U denote the set of resources used by the ith configuration.  Initially, |S| = |U|.  A 
process of m successive intersections among the subsets Cj ∩ Ck=j (i ≤  j, k ≤· m) are 
performed.  Each successive intersection reduces |S| until after the mth intersection at time 
t = m eventually |S| = 1, completing the fault-location process.  Each experiment was 
conducted with |U| = 1,000, 10,000, and 100,000.  The expected number of iterations to 
isolate the fault are reported for the mean values observed over 100 trials of the 
simulator.  An individual logic resource is the equivalent of a CLB in an FPGA so the 
range of resource pool sizes reflect a realistic device scenario. 
In the first set of experiments, the inputs applied consistently articulate any fault in the 
logic resources used by the configurations under test.  Thus, a match output indicates that 
the logic resources used by the configurations being compared are completely fault-free.  
A discrepancy between the configurations’ functional outputs indicates the presence of at 
least one resource fault.  Assertion of the MATCH output exonerates all logic resources 
currently being used, and a de-assertion of the MATCH output implicates the subset of 
logic resources currently being used as suspect.  The faulty resource is isolated after m 
pairings through a process of successive intersection.  Figure 4.3 shows the faulty 
resource can be identified using an expected value of 11.1 pairings when |U| = 1,000 and 
half of the resources are utilized by each configuration.  When |U| = 100,000, the mean 
number of pairings required to locate the fault increases by much less than a factor of ten 
to a value of 17.6.  Under more demanding parameters, when |U| =100,000, and when 
only 5% of the resources are being used by each configuration, a mean value of 63.7 
pairings are required to isolate the faulty resource. 
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 Figure 4.5: Fault Isolation with Perpetually Articulating Inputs 
Depending on the inputs applied, the fault in the functional logic under test may remain 
dormant and thus some inputs would not articulate a visible discrepancy.  In this case, a 
match output from the discrepancy mirror cannot evaluate whether all the resources under 
test are fault-free.  A discrepant output is a definitive indicator of the existence of a 
single-fault.  With such Intermittently Articulating Inputs, the discrepancy mirror based 
scheme requires additional random pairings to isolate the single-fault.  As shown in 
Figure 4.4, when |U| = 1, 000, with resource utilization at 45%, an expected 42 random 
pairings are required to uniquely identify the faulty resource.  When |U| = 100, 000, the 
best performance is observed for a utilization of near 50%, where the expected value of 
random pairings is 64.1. 
 75
 Figure 4.6: Fault Isolation with Intermittently Articulating Inputs 
The discrepancy mirror is capable of handling faults in either the functional logic or the 
detector.  If there is a failure in either, then the output of the mirror remains de-asserted 
indicating the presence of at least one resource fault.  It is able to isolate the faulty 
resources with a expected number of random pairings that is sub-linear in the number of 
resources under test.  It does not depend upon a specific coding scheme or a pre-defined 
set of inputs.  Random pairings of configurations perform successive intersection of the 
resources under test to isolate the faulty resource.  Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show that 
more pairings are required to identify the faulty resource when the utilization of available 
resources is below 20% or above 80%.  In these situations, each successive pairing 
implicates (or exonerates) a smaller sub-set of resources than when half of the resources 
are utilized.  Finally, using a discrepancy mirror based approach, the number of pairings 
required for fault location increases sub-linearly with an increase in |U|.  For example, at 
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50% utilization, the expected number of pairings to locate a fault within pools of 1,000, 
10,000, and 100,000 resources are 11.1, 14.9, and 17.6, respectively, demonstrating the 
viability of the technique.  Though the model is abstract, and of minimal complexity, the 
case-study demonstrates the viability of the discrepancy detector, and provides the basis 
for investigating group testing-based approaches to FPGA fault isolation.  
There are certain cases where the simple fault isolation scheme described above may fail 
to converge on a single faulty resource.  A trivial case is when all the resources available 
on the FPGA are used by each configuration.  If the application demands that all the 
resources be used, then isolation cannot occur through the process of successive 
intersection.  Also, in cases where a very low number of resources are used by individual 
configurations, it is possible that none of the individuals utilize the faulty resource, 
leading to the state where no discrepancies will be observed.  The most challenging case 
is when multiple individuals utilize the faulty resource.  In this situation, the history 
matrix elements corresponding to the intersection of the subset of resources used by these 
individuals will have no relative differences, and will all have the highest value.  
Successive intersections between the resource subsets will not lead to any further fault 
isolation.  For example, with a resource utilization of 40% in a device with 40,000 unit 
resources, isolation proceeds as shown in Figure 4.5.  The isolation cannot be completed, 
and after about 23 iterations, the number of suspected faulty elements stays a constant at 
36.  Any further isolation cannot occur since there is none of the intersections that may 
follow provide any additional isolation information.  This necessitates an algorithm based 
on group testing. 
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Figure 4.7: Successive Isolation as Input Iterations Increase 
4.5. Fault Isolation using Halving and Column-Swapping 
To avoid the problem of not being able to proceed with isolation in certain cases where 
successive iterations do not provide isolation information, a dueling algorithm is 
proposed which tries to emulate halving.  Halving is the process of successively reducing 
the size of the subgroup under test by half until, finally a test of a single element is 
required to identify the faulty element.   
The algorithm works by swapping columns in the configurations of individual elements.  
When the fault isolation process approaches a state of stasis, some of the columns in the 
individuals are swapped.  The number of columns to be swapped is determined by 
considering the number of resources currently suspected of being faulty.  A number of 
columns equal to half of the remaining number of suspect elements are swapped with 
other columns in the same individual.  This will introduce new information, as some of 
the suspected faulty elements used by the individual earlier will no longer be used, for 
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example.  Swapping is restricted only to the columns to facilitate future implementation 
in FPGA hardware.  As shown in Figure 4.6, isolation proceeds till a single faulty 
element is isolated under the same conditions under which the results shown in Figure 
4.5, for dueling without swapping were obtained. 
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Figure 4.8: Isolation Progress when Halving is used 
In order to analyze the behavior of the dueling algorithm with modified halving, further 
experiments were conducted to see the implications of various factors on the isolation 
process.  In each of the following experiments, the population size specifies the number 
of competing individual configurations in the population.  Resource utilization, expressed 
as a percentage signifies the amount of available resources used by an application 
implemented on the FPGA.  The FPGA device is simulated by using a square matrix of 
order n where n denotes the number of rows and columns in the device.  Each of the 
experiments that follow list average values observed over 100 experimental trials. 
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The effect of the size of the isolation problem was evaluated by applying the proposed 
technique to simulated FPGAs of various array sizes.  As shown in Figure 4.7, for an 
isolation problem where there are 100 rows and columns, or 10000 elements, only an 
average of 14.3 iterations are required to isolate a single fault.  As the size of the array 
containing the fault increases, the increase in the required number of iterations is 
minimal.  For example, for the difficult case where there is a single fault in 1 million 
resources, the algorithm requires only an average of 27.4 iterations to isolate the fault, 
showing that the algorithm scales well with the size of problem.  
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Figure 4.9: Isolation Performance as a Function of the Total Number of Elements 
As the population size increases, fault isolation is expected to become faster, since more 
information will be available to the algorithm from the increased population size. 
However, a very high population size may lead to more individuals being affected by the 
same fault.  As shown in Figure 4.8, the number of iterations required for isolation, with 
40000 elements, and 50% resource utilization shows a tendency to decrease with an 
increase in the population size.  For a population of size 60, only an average of 17.2 
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iterations are required for isolation.  Practically, however, a very high population size will 
imply the need for a higher number of alternative individual configurations.  A 
population size of 30 seems to be an ideal tradeoff between ease of isolation, and the 
difficulty of generating increased number of individuals. 
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Figure 4.10: Isolation Performance as a Function of the Population Size 
4.6. Isolating Embedded Cores using Group Testing 
Although group testing-based methods are primarily presented as a tool to improve upon 
existing run-time fault isolation techniques, they are also amenable to post-manufacturing 
testing of FPGAs.  In this chapter a specific example of using group testing techniques to 
accelerate the isolation of faulty embedded cores in FPGAs is presented. 
The current generation of 65 nm FPGAs by Xilinx, such as the Virtex-5 platform FPGAs 
introduce space-efficient hard IP cores implemented using the column-based Application 
Specific Modular Block (ASMBL) architecture.  The Virtex-5 platform provides anywhere 
from 32 to 640 embedded DSP48E cores across a range of devices [45].  These cores are 
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designed, placed, and routed into the fabric of the FPGA, and have been characterized 
and verified to optimize performance.  Unlike soft IP cores, these enable designers to 
utilize the Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) as general-purpose logic resources and 
minimize the space and power required to implement DSP applications on FPGAs.  The 
embedded IP cores are characterized by their predictable timing and are optimized to 
work efficiently in a manner independent of the rest of the design.  These cores are highly 
customizable based on the designers requirements and provide a range of in-built 
structures for efficient arithmetic calculation and signal processing requirements.  All 
these characteristics lend to more efficient implementation of an entire system on an 
FPGA known commonly as a System On Programmable Chip (SOPC).  The development 
of FPGAs with an increasing number of embedded hard IP cores drives the need for 
faster testing methods for failures in the cores.  
The embedded cores are distributed throughout the FPGA fabric and as an integral part of 
the computational resources, these require extensive post-manufacturing testing and 
verification.  It is therefore important to develop testing methods to identify hardware 
faults with minimal latency and resource overheads. 
4.6.1. BIST-based Testing of Embedded FPGA Cores 
Advances in FPGA production technologies have improved capabilities to the point 
where FPGAs have dedicated embedded cores, in addition to multiplexers and Block 
RAMs.  The most widely accepted approach to detect faults at the chip level in VLSI is to 
apply BIST on the components [46-48].  The built-in nature of BIST also allows testing 
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the chip in a variety of working environments.  In BIST both the Test Pattern Generation 
(TPG) and Output Response Analyzer (ORA) are incorporated inside the chip.  Assuming 
that all levels of the hierarchy use BIST, each element can test itself and transmits the 
result to the succeeding level in the hierarchy.  BIST also increases controllability and 
observability by providing access to the internal nodes since tester logic is located on the 
chip.  BIST allows tests to be run at system speed and eliminates this gap.   
BIST has been the choice of convention for testing Embedded Memory [46, 47].  
Conventional ASIC BIST techniques typically accrue between 10% to 30% area 
overhead and delay penalties [48].  Therefore, it is essential that the FPGA core test 
method leverages the reprogrammability inherent in FPGAs.  An additional advantage of 
utilizing the programmable feature of an FPGA to test itself is that BIST logic can be 
removed when the circuit is reconfigured for another use and testability is achieved 
without permanent area overhead or performance degradation. 
There has been considerable research on developing and applying BIST techniques for 
programmable logic resources in an FPGA including CLBs [49, 50] and interconnect 
matrix of routing resource [16, 51].  Abramovici and Stroud [49] presented BIST 
architecture to test CLBs in an FPGA.  In their scheme, a column or (a row) of CLB is 
configured to generate pseudo-exhaustive test patterns to alternating columns of 
identically configured CLBs under test.  They use two identical TPGs to detect any fault 
in the CLBs used to construct TPGs.  Comparator-based ORAs monitor the output of the 
BUTs and latch mismatches due to faults.  The BUTs are tested and configured for 
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different modes of operation.  Each complete test (session) covers only half of the CLBs 
and another session is required to test the other half. 
 The diagnostic procedure called MULTICELLO (Multiple faulty Cell Locator) 
developed by Abramovici et al., identifies faulty BUTs based on the failing BIST results.  
Stroud and Garimella [52] targeted multiple regular structure cores including memories 
and multipliers and developed a diagnostic procedure based on the extension of the 
MULTICELLO algorithm.  The diagnostic procedure is performed in five steps.  They 
presented a BIST approach in which neighboring blocks are compared by a set of ORAs.  
Thus, each core is observed by two sets of ORAs and is compared to two different cores.  
Circular comparison of the first and last block covers the corner block.  Following and 
applying the MULTICELLO algorithm, Garimella and Stroud [53] presented 
development of an automated BIST generation for embedded Block RAMs in an FPGA, 
based on parameterized VHDL model.  The MULTICELLO algorithm provides a good 
diagnostic resolution and is able to locate the faulty blocks (unless all blocks have 
equivalent faults).  However, it is not applicable when testing a set of two blocks in 
cascade mode.  For example, in many applications and operations it is required that two 
DSP blocks cascaded together to produce the final outputs.  In this case, they produce 
different outputs and therefore it is not possible to compare the outputs of neighboring 
blocks.   
Renovell et al. [54] present a method to test the LUT/RAM modules of FPGAs using a 
minimal number of test configuration by proposing a model architecture with N inputs 
and 2N memory cells.  With a unique test configuration, they test a single module by 
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extending conventional algorithms for testing SRAM modules such as the March tests 
[55].  They also propose a unique test configuration called pseudo shift register.  In this 
method, the circuit operates as a shift register and the MATS++ algorithm is adapted to 
test the FPGA RAM modules.  However this method is limited to the SRAM modules on 
the FPGA, or the LUTS operating in the SRAM mode.  Current state-of-the-art FPGAs 
such as the Spartan-3a DSP FPGAs from Xilinx offer embedded SoPC DSP modules that 
include dedicated 18×18 multipliers along with 18-bit pre-adder and 48-bit post-
adder/accumulations and dedicated DSP circuitry consisting of DSP48A slices [56].  
Earlier Sarvi et al [57] developed a diagnostic method to detect and locate faulty 
embedded cores in FPGAs using BIST was developed.  However, the technique 
configures the device twice in order to complete fault isolation.  The method partitions 
the cores on an FPGA into two groups and conducts BIST on each of these groups.  Fault 
isolation is achieved by comparing the results of the two tests.  Under this scheme the 
two configurations are constructed to enable isolation by comparison.  In post-processing, 
defectives are identified by analyzing the results of comparisons among blocks enclosed 
within the same group.  However, this method fails to isolate faulty blocks when there is 
a defective block in each of the compared pairs.   
Improvement over previous approaches is attained using an automated diagnostic 
methodology that is applicable to different cores, including DSP cores, that takes into 
account the different modes of operation such as cascade and direct.  The group-testing 
enhanced method is scalable to different FPGA families including the Xilinx XtremeDSP 
products and the Virtex-5 family of FPGAs.  Further, these techniques can be easily 
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extended to provide testing coverage for new families of embedded cores on FPGAs 
since the method is core-independent.  A significant improvement is the one-shot testing 
of all embedded cores of a specified type using a single test pattern.  Group testing 
techniques are utilized to generate a non-adaptive testing regimen that involves a single 
group of tests executed concurrently.  The test provides complete coverage for all cores 
of a type on the chip by dividing the cores-under-test into subsets with a cardinality of 
four.  By generating, comparing and encoding the outputs produced by the cores in 
response to the test pattern, complete fault resolution is achieved in a single test. 
4.6.2. Enhancing Embedded Core BIST using Group Testing Techniques  
The embedded IP cores in the Xilinx Virtex-5 family of devices are distributed evenly 
throughout the fabric ensuring optimal timing.  The BIST technique proposed in this 
article utilizes the CLBs adjacent to the embedded cores to realize the TPG and the ORA.  
Each embedded core comprises a BUT.  The current generation Virtex-5 FPGAs from 
Xilinx include embedded cores in the form of 36-Kbit Block dual-port Block RAMs and 
Advanced DSP48E slices.  The DSP48E slices provide a range of functionality such as 
two’s complement, multiplication, and optional adder, subtracter, and accumulator.  
These also provide pipelining and dedicated cascade connections.  The number of 
DSP48E slices in the Virtex-5 FPGAs varies from 32 in the XC5VLX30 device to 640 in 
the XC5VSX95T device.  In the experiments described here, the DSP48E slices are the 
blocks under test. 
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Under the proposed group testing-based technique, the m embedded cores on the device 
are divided into m/4 = n groups of BUTs.  Tests are conducted on these groups to provide 
fault isolation in a single-stage, non-adaptive group testing regimen.  Comparators kn 
generate a PASS/FAIL result based on discrepancies between the outputs of two of the 
BUTs.  For a group of 4 BUTs, a total of six comparators are required to compare each 
BUT’s output with that of all the other BUTs in the same group.  For purposes of 
simplicity, Figure 4.10 shows the replicable BIST model in its smallest scale, considering 
one such group of 4 BUTs, numbered B0 through B3.  It is assumed that the CLBs and 
routing resources have been tested for correct functionality.  
 
Figure 4.11: BIST Structure for Testing a Group of Four Blocks Under Test 
The TPG is realized using an FSM  to realize the states required for testing the embedded 
cores.  In order to test the DSP48E cores, the FSM generates 400 states and 14-bit wide 
control signals for each state.  The control signal bits are comprised of a 7-bit opmode 
signal, a 3-bit carryin_sel signal, and a 4-bit wide alumode signal.  These serve as control 
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inputs to each of the DSP48E embedded cores.  For each of the 400 states, the FSM 
generates valid combinations of these 14 control signals which define the function 
implemented on the DSP48E at any given clock signal.  The FSM is optimized via XST 
into one 512x17 ROM and a 14-bit registered output.  This ROM is realized as one of the 
embedded BRAM cores which is pre-defined through initialization.  State-transitions are 
performed via a 9-bit adder, whose output is registered using a 9-bit register.  The three 
data operands for the DSP48E cores are generated using one 18-bit Linear Feedback Shift 
Register (LFSR), one 48-bit LFSR and one 30-bit LFSR. 
Each pair of BUTs requires a 48-bit comparator and 4 1-bit comparators for their outputs 
to be compared for discrepancies.  In addition to these, for each pair of BUTs, a 2×1 
multiplexer is used to serialize the results of the comparators.  Thus for every group of 
BUTs, a total of six 2×1 multiplexers are required.  This circuitry is further optimized as 
described in the following section.  Figure 2 shows these six comparators k1(i,j) for 
comparing the outputs of the 4 BUTs in group n = 1.  technique uses a test controller in 
addition to the TPG and the ORA, to activate the test routine by asserting the START 
signal.  Termination of the test is achieved when the DONE signal is asserted, followed 
by the propagation of the test results.  
4.6.3. Embedded Core Fault Isolation Experiments on Virtex-5 FPGAs 
As a particular example of the BIST technique, experiments were conducted on the 
Virtex-5 family of Xilinx FPGAs.  The testing of an XC5VLX30 device provides the 
following case study which further elaborates the procedure.  The XC5VLX30 device 
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consists of 36 DSP48E embedded cores, with 4800 slices that provide 19200 LUTs.  The 
m = 36 embedded cores on the  XC5VLX30 device are divided into n = 8 groups.  Since 
six 2-to-1 multiplexers are required for each group, a total of 48 such multiplexers are 
required.  However, the synthesized design optimally uses six 8-to-1 multiplexers. 
 
Figure 4.12: BIST Structure used for Testing the XC5VLX30 Device 
A block diagram of the scheme is shown in Figure 4.11.  As shown in the figure, a total 
of six multiplexers and flip flops, numbered muxo through mux5 and FFo  through FF5 
are utilized.  There are six columns of comparators, with each column consisting of eight 
comparators, k0 through k7.  Comparators kn(i,j), 0 ≤ i,j ≤ 3,∀ i ≠ j complete the test for a 
group of four BUTs as shown in Figure 2.  The results for comparisons among one group 
of BUTs, for example, the results from k0(0,1), k0(0,2), k0(0,3), k0(1,2), k0(1,3) and k0(2,3) 
are registered in the flip flops FF0  through FF5..  This is then repeated for the other 
groups, using the 3-bit counter to enable the succeeding inputs of each multiplexer.  
Thus, at the end of each test, when the inputs from the TPG have been applied, the 
counter goes through all the multiplexer inputs and sending the output of the six flip flops 
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simultaneously to 6 1-bit outputs.  The fault diagnosis script then processes the results of 
each set of 6 outputs to resolve the location of the defective BUTs.  This can lead to 
isolation of faults in any two of the four BUTs in each group, irrespective of the location 
of the faulty BUTs within each group.   
Table 4.4: Resource Utilization Results from Experiments Conducted on the Xilinx 
Virtex-5 Family of FPGAs 
 
Device DSP48E Available Slices 
Available 
LUTs 
Available 
FFs 
Resource Utilization under 
Test (Percentage) 
LUTs Flip flops 
XC5VLX30 32 4800 19200 19200 1,418 (7%) 384 (2%) 
XC5VLX50 48 7200 28800 28800 1862 (6%) 408 (1%) 
XC5VLX85 48 12960 51840 51840 1862 (6%) 408 (1%) 
XC5VLX110 64 17280 69120 69120 2300 (3%) 432 (1%) 
XC5VLX155 128 24320 97280 97280 4058 (4%) 528 (1%) 
XC5VLX220 128 34560 138240 138240 4058 (2%) 528 (1%) 
XC5VLX330 192 51840 207360 207360 5822 (2%) 624 (1%) 
XC5VSX35T 192 5440 21760 21760 5822 (26%) 624 (2%) 
XC5VSX50T 288 8160 32640 32640 8462 (25%) 768 (2%) 
XC5VSX95T 640 14720 58880 58880 18139 (30%) 1296 (2%) 
 
The solution was implemented on various devices of the Virtex-5 family.  Table 4.4 
summarizes the resource usage for each of these devices.  As listed in the Table, for the 
XC5VSX95T device, which contains 640 DSP48E embedded cores, the device utilization 
during testing is approximately 30%.  In Table 4.4, all Utilization Percentage figures less 
than 1% have been rounded up to 1%.  Also, each Slice in the Virtex-5 family of FPGAs 
contains four LUTs and four flip flops. 
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Embedded cores within FPGAs provide improved performance by optimizing area and 
power consumption.  With improvements in the process technology, the smaller 
geometries will drive the inclusion of an increasing number of diverse hard IP blocks in 
FPGAs.  As shown in this article, the XC5VSX95T device in the Virtex-5 family 
contains 640 DSP cores and 488 Block RAM cores.  This shows the need for efficient 
fault isolation techniques to diagnose these devices to improve yields and facilitate faster 
debugging.  The demonstrated technique achieves the goal of fast detection and isolation 
of faults by leveraging a group testing technique that isolates faulty embedded cores in a 
single-step procedure that precludes the need for device reconfiguration.  The approach is 
scalable at the cost of area overhead.  However, no permanent area cost or performance 
overheads are incurred as a result of testing.  This technique can be used in conjunction 
with other existing methods for isolating faults in interconnect and CLBs to provide 
complete post-manufacturing testing for FPGAs with embedded cores.  
4.7. Improving GA Performance Using CGT 
The fault isolation provided by Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) can be utilized to 
accelerate the design and repair process in a genetic algorithm.  To demonstrate the 
benefit using an example, A CGT-pruned GA was developed [58] to evaluate the 
performance benefit obtained by using the halving testing scheme.  As shown in Figure 
4.13, the simulator for the CGT-Pruned GA optionally uses a seed configuration and uses 
the resource information provided by the CGT technique to effect refurbishment in faulty 
configurations using the GA.  The simulator is a C++ based console application that 
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consists of two main components: the CGT procedure and the GA.  The CGT algorithm 
uses the Gnu Scientific Library (GSL) and simulates the fault location method. The GA is 
implemented using an object oriented architecture that contains classes which model the 
FPGA resources with flexible geometries such as the Configurable Logic Block (CLB) 
and Look-Up Table (LUT) classes, and others that model the GA such as Individual and 
Generation classes.  When this simulator is run in the CGT-pruned GA mode, the CGT 
component simulates the desired FPGA chip and obtains resource performance 
information which is an input to the GA.  The GA then performs evolutionary design or 
reads the Seed Configuration file and performs evolutionary repair according to the active 
mode of operation.  In the Conventional GA mode, the CGT component is not invoked 
and no resource performance information is available to the GA. 
 
Figure 4.13:  CGT-Pruned GA Simulator 
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Table 4.5: CGT-Pruned GA - Repair Performance 
Experiment Type Conventional Repair 
CGT-pruned 
Repair 
Circuit 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier 
3-bit x 2-bit 
Multiplier 
Number of 
Experiments 30 30 
Arithmetic Mean 
(Generations) 17150 10700  
Standard Deviation 15650 12550 
Standard Error of the 
Mean 2850 2300 
68% Confidence 
Interval [14300 → 20000] [8400 → 13000] 
In the experiments, a 3-bit × 2-bit multiplier is circuit evolved from seed configurations, 
and in the repair experiments, functional circuit representations with a simulated fault are 
repaired.  The optimized GA parameters used were a mutation rate of 0.05, a crossover 
rate of 0.4, and a population size of 25.  Further, elitism was imposed where the two best-
fit configurations from a generation were propagated to the next generation.  The 
simulated FPGA architecture consisted of 15 CLBs configured with a strict feed-forward 
topology.  As listed in Table 4.5, with a single stuck-at fault, the CGT-pruned GA 
outperformed a GA unassisted by the results of group testing in the experiment 
concerning the repair of individuals affected by the fault.  Over 30 trials, the CGT-pruned 
GA required an average of 10700 generations to realize a repair as opposed to 17150 
generations for the non CGT-pruned GA.  Further the result ranges do not overlap at the 
68% confidence interval, which makes the result more statistically significant.  
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CHAPTER 5: LOGIC ELEMENT ISOLATION USING 
AUTONOMOUS GROUP TESTING 
The logic resources on a Xilinx FPGA device are organized as a two-dimensional array 
of CLBs [59].  Each CLB consists of 4 slices, which in turn contain two 4-input LUTs.  
In the AGT-based fault isolation method described, a logic resource refers to a slice in 
the FPGA.  As shown in Figure 5.1, the FPGA is seen as a two-dimensional array of 
resources, each resource being a slice.  The fault model accounts for stuck-at faults at the 
inputs of one of the two LUTs in a slice specified by its (x,y) coordinate pair.   
Processor
Core
SLICE
LUTs
FPGA
 
Figure 5.1: FPGA Resources as Seen by the Group Testing Algorithm 
5.1. Terminology and Nomenclature for Analysis of Autonomous Group Testing 
Techniques 
Let R denote the set of all resources ri(x,y) ∈ R under test as specified by their (x,y) 
coordinates.  A set of functionally-equivalent logic configurations, C, consisting of 
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subsets ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ p, where p quantifies the size of a population of design configurations.  
Each configuration realizes the combinatorial logic required for the application.   
The population preset value ppreset determines the maximum number of individuals in a 
generation so that pstage ≤ ppreset as testing progresses.  At each stage of the adaptive 
testing algorithm, the configurations in the population are replaced by new designs, 
creating a new generation of individuals. 
T denotes the set of binary input vectors applied and ti ∈ T are the individual input 
vectors.  These inputs to the implemented combinatorial logic are also the test vectors for 
the isolation procedure.  Let the function implemented on the FPGA be denoted by 
F(T, ci).  If any of the resources in ci used to realize F(T, ci) are faulty, then the response 
will deviate from the correct realization, for some subset  T’ ⊂ T which articulate the 
fault as follows: 
Definition 5.1.  The syndrome T’ of a configuration ci is the set of positive tests for the 
configuration.  
Definition 5.2.  The discrepancy function D(T’, cj) yields a set of all outputs that are not 
equal to the correct output, as realized when tests comprising the syndrome, T’ are 
applied to configuration cj.  Tests T’ ⊂ T on a subset cj are positive if and only if 
D(T’, cj) ≠ {}, and negative otherwise. 
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Definition 5.3.  The articulation rate a(ci) for a configuration ci is the ratio of the number 
of incorrect outputs to the cardinality of the entire output space: 
 Articulation rate, a(ci) = ||
|'|
T
T . (5.1) 
Since the articulation rate cannot controlled by the designer, it introduces randomness 
into the rate of progress of fault isolation as discussed in section 6.2.  Fault isolation 
proceeds by reducing the cardinality of the set of suspects, S. S is defined as the 
intersection of resources ri(x,y) ∈ ci used by all ci ∀ D(T’, ci) ≠ {}.  The set of all viable 
resources tenable to creating fault-free configurations is denoted by S , such that 
S ∪  = R.   S
Definition 5.4.  Forward Progress is made, if, as fault isolation proceeds, |S| decreases 
and | | decreases, until finally |S| = d,  the number of known defectives.  S
As fault isolation progresses |S| decreases and | S | increases, until finally |S| = d, the 
number of known defectives. 
Definition 5.5.  The defect scouring ratio, d(stage) defines the ratio of number of known 
suspects |S| to | |, given the number of test stages that have been completed: S
 |S|
|S|=d(stage)  (5.2) 
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5.2. Autonomous Group Testing Algorithm Overview 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the AGT algorithm comprises of three phases of fault isolation 
which occur after the fault has been detected.  First, in the initialization phase, all 
elements of the History Matrix, H, described in Section 5.3, are initialized to zero.  In 
addition, since the isolation procedure is yet to begin, the set of suspect resources, S is 
equal to the set of resources under test, R.  After initialization, the pstage configurations 
that comprise the first testing stage are created, which forms the second phase of the 
algorithm.  The third phase consists of performing tests on the configuration thus created.  
Phases 2 and 3 are repeated until the defective resource is isolated. 
Before the configurations for a stage are created in phase 2, the equal share factor, nshare, 
and the population size, pstage, are determined as described in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, 
respectively.  Once nshare is known, the pstage individuals that comprise the first test stage 
are created using the Fault Injection and Analysis Toolkit (FIAT) described in Section 
5.9.  During the fault isolation phase shown in Figure 5.2, isolation proceeds by applying 
random test vectors which emulate the input data stream to randomly selected 
configurations that comprise the first test stage.  This process continues until stasis is 
attained, as described in Section 5.6.  After the system attains stasis, a new testing stage is 
created, and fault isolation is pursued until the defective resource is identified. 
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Figure 5.2: AGT Process Flow 
5.3. Tracking Defectives Using the History Matrix 
The history matrix, H, keeps track of the discrepancy counts of the resources.  As shown 
in Figure 5.2, all elements in the H matrix are initialized to zero.  As a stage of tests 
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proceeds, for each test ti for which D(ti, cj) ≠ {}, all H matrix entries H(x,y) are 
incremented by one where (x,y) are the coordinates of all ri(x,y) ∈ cj.  Over time, the 
maximal elements in H identify suspect resources by their coordinates.  Under a single-
fault assumption, fault isolation is complete when a unique maximum can be identified in 
H.  The defective resource will be identified by the coordinates of the maximal element in 
H. 
5.4. The Equal Sharing Test Group Formation Strategy 
Initially, S = R, since no information is available regarding the fitness of any of the 
resources.  The algorithm proceeds in stages, with a new generation of individuals being 
created in each stage.  In each stage, the members of S are equally shared among the 
configurations ci, 0 < i < pstage-1 in the generation. 
The remaining nreqd resources required to realize the design are randomly selected from 
the set S  which has a cardinality |R| - |S|.  Thus each individual ci will be allocated |R| - 
|S| + |S|/pstage resources.  Hence if the number of suspects |S| is small enough such 
that |R| - |S| + |S|/ pstage > nreqd , then the configurations in that group will have mutually 
exclusive shares of the suspect resources, with each individual configuration ci being 
allocated exclusive resources rj(x,y) ∈ ci , rj(x,y) ∉ ck, where 0 < k < pstage-1.  Otherwise, 
some suspect resources need to be shared among the configurations to meet the 
application resource demand nreqd.  The maximum cardinality of |S| such that mutually 
exclusive shares of suspect resources are possible, denoted by |Smax| can be obtained by 
evaluating the following expression: 
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 reqd
preset
n
p
SSR =+− |||||| maxmax , (5.3) 
which yields: 
 |)|()1(
|| max Rnp
p
S reqd
preset
preset −×−=  (5.4) 
If |S| > |Smax| then the equal share factor, nshare, is derived by rearranging Equation(5.5) to 
yield Equation(6.6): 
 sharereqd nSRn +−= ||||  (5.5) 
 |||| SRnn reqdshare +−=  (5.6) 
Figure 5.3 shows an example of how |S| = 30 suspect resources from among |R| = 100 
resources are shared among pstage = 2 configurations.  In case 1, nreqd = 85, yielding |Smax| 
= 30 using Equation(6.4).  Since |S| = |Smax| in this scenario, configurations c0 and c1 use 
mutually exclusive subsets of S, and they both use all ri(x,y) ∈ S  to satisfy the 
application resource demand.  In scenario 2, however, nreqd = 91, and thus, |Smax| = 18.  
Since |S| > |Smax|, the equal share factor is evaluated using Equation(6.6) to be nshare = 21.  
As shown for case 2 in Figure 5.3, c0 and c1 share |S| - 2 × nshare = 12 suspect resources. 
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Alternative resource allocation strategies can be adopted to replace the equal share 
strategy.  For instance, in [60], an Interleaved Allocation strategy is proposed that ensures 
that each LUT in the Suspect pool is used by more than one individual in every new 
stage.  This will reduce the probability that a faulty LUT does not articulate the fault for 
the observed test vectors.  The strategy uses a Coverage Factor to determine the number 
of different individuals that utilize any suspect resource.  The interleaved allocation 
scheme adopts a low-risk approach by covering each suspected resource with two or 
more configurations, making it less probable that a group of testing yields no 
improvement. 
xy
S SC
Configuration c0 Configuration c1
|R| = 100, |S| = 30, pstage = 2
Scenario 1: nreqd = 85
Scenario 2: nreqd = 91
1
2
2
2
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3
33
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4 4
Region 1 : All suspect resources, S
Region 2 : Suspect resources unused
by configuration ci
Region 3 : Resources used by
configuration ci
Region 4 : Suspect resources shared
by c0 and c1
Configuration c0 Configuration c1  
Figure 5.3: Sharing the Suspect Resources Equally – Two Different Scenarios
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5.5. Adapting the Population Size for Optimal Resource Coverage 
In order to reduce the number of individuals under test, the population size is adapted.  
For example, if in the final stage of testing, |S| = 3 even though the ppreset may be greater 
than 3, only 3 individuals, each using one of the suspect resources is required for 
isolation to complete.  Such a situation occurs frequently in the beginning of the isolation 
process.  For example, with a resource redundancy ratio, rr = 0.5, in the first stage, only 
two individuals are required to cover the entire resource space.  Additional individuals 
will only form tests for resources that are already covered by these two, and will thus be 
redundant.  The number of individuals required in any stage of testing is given by: 
 ⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡=
share
||
n
Spstage  (5.7) 
Reducing the number of individuals in a test stage provides two benefits.  First, it 
significantly reduces the time required for the fault isolation process.  Secondly, it 
reduces the number of redundant test groups – making the algorithm more reasonable.  In 
particular, a reasonable group testing procedure is one that contains no test whose 
outcome can be predicted from outcomes of other tests conducted previously [12]. 
Once nshare and pstage are known, the individuals for a given generation are created, and 
then tested.  As shown in Figure 5.2, testing comprises the third phase of the isolation 
process.  The tests are conducted by randomly selecting an individual ci for instantiation 
on the FPGA.  A test vector tj is then applied to the individual.  If  D(ti, cj) ≠ {}, all H 
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matrix entries H(x,y) are incremented by one where (x, y) are the coordinates of all ri(x,y) 
∈ cj.  Regardless of whether there is a discrepancy, this configuration is then replaced by 
another, and the testing continues.  When a configuration containing the defective 
resource is tested, the probability of the fault being expressed as a discrepant output is 
governed by the articulation rate, a(ci), of that configuration.  Once a fault is articulated, 
the set of suspects will be reduced to the intersection of the resources utilized by cj and 
the resources H(x,y) = Hmax.  Thus: 
 Snew =  cj ∩ H (5.8) 
where hmax  is the maximal element in the history matrix H(x,y) 
5.6. Overcoming Stasis During Isolation 
A state of Stasis is encountered in a stage of the isolation procedure if further tests on 
configurations comprising the stage are expected to lead to no significant reduction in the 
number of suspect resources.  By Definition 6.4, stasis occurs when forward progress 
stalls.  Defining a method to overcome stasis is essential to ensure fast fault isolation.   
Since the suspect resources were equally shared among the individuals in the population, 
the maximum possible reduction in |S| is given by: 
 share
new
n
S
S =
||
||
 (5.9) 
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Once |Snew| is obtained, the system is defined to have entered a state of stasis, when 
further improvements to the defect scouring ratio, d(stage), have stalled.  Further 
reduction in |S|, beyond those described in Equation(6.9) is only possible if there exists 
another individual in the same generation that also utilizes the defective resource.  Since 
such an individual is not guaranteed to exist and to articulate the fault, stasis is declared 
after the suspect pool is reduced by the factor shown in Equation(6.9).  Stasis can also 
occur when the individual utilizing the defective resource does not articulate the fault, or 
does so with a very low articulation rate.  Thus, stasis occurs when no discrepant outputs 
are observed after a fixed number of inputs are applied. 
5.7. Walkthrough of Isolation Process 
As an example of the isolation process, consider a situation where there is one defective 
resource with the coordinates (1,8) in a set of R = 100 resources, where ri(x,y) ∈ R, 
0 < x,y < 9.  For simplicity, let us assume that a configuration that utilizes the defective 
resource always articulates the fault at the output.  The number of resources required to 
implement the application is nreqd = 35.  Thus, for the first stage, by Equation(6.6): 
 nshare = 35 – 100 +100 = 35 (5.10) 
For nshare = 35, and population preset, ppreset = 5, by Equation(6.7), we have: 
 Population size for the first stage , 335
100
1 =⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡=p  (5.11) 
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Thus, in the first stage, there are three configurations, the first, c0 uses resources ri(x,y) 
where 0 < x < 4, 0 < y < 5,  i.e., 35 resources with coordinates (0,0) through (3,4) 
inclusive; c1 uses resources with coordinates (3,5) through (6,9) and c2 uses resources 
(7,0) through (9,9) and (0,0) through (0,4) inclusive.  Over a period, each of these three 
configurations are chosen at random and inputs are applied, until a discrepancy is 
observed.  Since the defective resource (1,8) is used by c0, this configuration will 
articulate the fault.  When this occurs, the H matrix entries corresponding to the resources 
with coordinates (0,0) through (3,4) used by c0 will be incremented by one.  The set of 
suspect resources S now has a cardinality of 35, and contains the resources used by c0.  
After this first discrepant output, the cardinality of S  exceeds the critical cardinality of 
35.  Also, the prime realization for this experiment is 1, since c1 is known fault-free after 
c0 is identified as the discrepant configuration. 
As the set of suspects has diminished by a factor equal to nshare, the next stage of 
configurations is formed.  The number of suspects can be divided equally among the 
members of this new stage, thus, each new configuration will contain 35/5 = 7 suspect 
resources.  The rest of the resources to create the 5 configurations are chosen at random 
from the 100-35 = 65 members of S .  Thus, in the second stage of testing, c0 will use the 
suspect resources with coordinates (0,0) through (0,6) and the other configurations will 
use 7 suspect resources each, in order.  The defective resource with coordinates (1,8) will 
be utilized by configuration c2.  In the tests performed in the second stage, c2 will 
articulate a fault, and H matrix entries corresponding to resources with coordinates (1,4) 
through (2,0) inclusive will be incremented by one. 
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In the next stage, only four configurations need be created, with the first three 
configurations utilizing two of the seven suspect resources.  This stage will further reduce 
S to two suspect resources.  Finally in the last stage of testing, only two configurations 
will be created, with the first using the resource with coordinates (1,8) and the second 
utilizing the resource with coordinates (1,9).  Tests on these two configurations will 
finally yield (1,8) as the defective resource.  Thus, in four stages, the defective resource 
will be uniquely identified. 
5.8. The Fault Isolation and Analysis Toolkit for Xilinx FPGAs 
The UCF Fault Injection and Analysis Toolkit (FIAT) is a set of Python APIs that aid the 
analysis of fault-testing algorithms for Xilinx FPGAs.  Faults are injected in the 
implemented designs by editing the design file.  This precludes the need to edit the 
configuration bitstream directly.  The Xilinx ISE design tools are used in the process flow 
to place and route the edited designs.  FIAT can be used to model and evaluate various 
testing regimens that seek to identify and isolate faults in FPGAs.  The toolkit enables 
easy injection of faults without directly modifying the bitstream.  The principle of 
interfering minimally with the functions of the Xilinx ISE is adopted to reduce accidental 
bitstream errors that may invalidate the design or even damage the FPGA.  The 
generation of post-place-and-route simulation executables offers a fast and reliable way 
of analyzing test routines without the additional expense of downloading the designs and 
reconfiguring FPGAs.  
 107
FIAT provides the following functions to enable the modeling and evaluation of group 
testing regimen: 
get_list_slices_used(proj_path, xdl_fn):  This method takes the project path(proj_path) 
and the xdl filename(xdl_fn) as inputs and returns a list of slices used by the design 
specified by the xdl file. 
get_slice_count(proj_path, xdl_fn): Returns an integer representing the number of slices 
used by the specified xdl file.  Inputs are the xdl filename(xdl_fn) and the project 
path(proj_path). 
is_slice_used(proj_path, xdl_fn, x, y):  Returns a Boolean value corresponding to whether 
or not a slice specified by its x and y coordinates is utilized by the design specified by the 
xdl filename(xdl_fn). 
disclists(list1, list2): This function returns an integer representing the number of 
discrepancies observed in comparing the two lists list1 and list2. 
modify_xdl(proj_path, xdl_fn, slice_coords, g_or_f, faulty_pin): The modify_xdl 
function inserts stuck-at faults in a specified design.  The slice where the stuck-at-fault is 
to be inserted is specified by a coordinate pair(slice_coords).  The G or F LUT in the 
slice can be chosen using the g_or_f parameter.  faulty_pin specifies the pin in the LUT 
where the stuck-at-fault needs to be injected. 
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create_ucf(proj_path, ucf_fn, occ_area_xy, f_max_x, f_max_y, occ_area, req_resources, 
pop): This method creates UCF files and placed-and-routed designs according to the 
specified parameters to aid the physical placement of the design on the FPGA.  The 
proj_path and ucf_fn parameters define the project path and the UCF filename.  
occ_area_xy specifies the area that the design has to be placed in as a coordinate pair.  
All resources outside the square area defined by occ_area_xy are prohibited from being 
used in the design. f_max_x and f_max_y specify the maximum value of the x and y 
coordinates for resources that can be utilized by the design.  occ_area defines the number 
of resources available for use by the design and req_resources defines the number of 
resources that are essential for instantiating the design.  This figure can be ascertained by 
assessing the minimum number of slices required by the design.  The pop parameter 
defines the population size, or the number of unique designs that need to be produced.  
The create_ucf function creates pop number of unique ucf files where the resources used 
are chosen at random.  The amount of slices available for implementing the design can be 
varied from (occ_area – req_resources) to occ_area depending on the needs of the test 
routine by using custom functions to determine the selection of resources.  After creating 
the UCF files, the create_ucf function proceeds to create the NCD files for the designs 
and converts the NCD files to XDL files which can then be modified according to need 
using the modify_xdl function. 
simulate_ppr(proj_path, sim_fn): The simulate_ppr function accepts the project path 
and the name of the simulation executable as inputs.  It invokes the Xilinx commands to 
compile the HDL design, testbench files, and simulation libraries to create the simulation 
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executables.  Finally it runs the simulation.  This is useful in conjunction with testbench 
files that save the output of the simulation in the form of text files. 
5.9. Creating and Modifying Alternatives with FIAT 
FIAT provides a high level of control over the physical location of the logical units used 
in the design.  In particular FIAT provides methods for modifying and parsing the User 
Constraint File (UCF) and the Xilinx Design Language (XDL) file.  The XDL file is a 
plain text file that can be created from the NCD file using the xdl command line tool 
provided by Xilinx.  Throughout the design flow, the Xilinx ISE tools are used all 
processes except for those that edit and parse the UCF and XDL files.  The tools provided 
by FIAT can be used for determining the physical placement of the logical units by 
editing the UCF file.  Stuck-at faults are injected into the design by converting the NCD 
file to the XDL format and then using the FIAT APIs to insert the fault at the chosen 
LUT.  The presence of a stuck-at fault ties the signal at the input of the chosen LUT in a 
slice to zero or one.  After fault injection, the XDL file is converted back to an NCD file.  
Placement and routing is completed automatically using the Xilinx ISE.  The post-place-
and-route simulation executable is created using the provide testbench and the simulation 
libraries. 
Figure 5.4 shows the processes that constitute the FIAT design flow.  The input files for 
the process are the HDL files specifying the combinatorial design to be instantiated on 
the FPGA.  These files are synthesized to build a netlist, which FIAT then builds, maps, 
places and routes using commands provided by the Xilinx ISE 9.1i tools.  In the last step 
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a post-place-and-route simulation executable is created using the user-provided testbench 
and the simulation libraries.  The same Native Circuit Description (NCD) file used to 
create the simulation executable can also yield the configuration bitstream for a hardware 
implementation of the design.  The generation of post-place-and-route simulation 
executables offers a flexible and accurate way of analyzing test routines.  In addition to 
providing methods to implement designs using the Xilinx commands, FIAT provides 
automated methods to edit physical constraints and to inject faults into configuration 
bitstreams. 
FIAT provides a high-level of control over the physical location of the slices used to 
create a configuration by providing APIs to modify the User Constraint File (UCF).  
This enables editing configurations before they are placed and routed.  Given a set of 
suspect resources to be used by each configuration, FIAT creates the UCF files to ensure 
the use of the suspect resources.  It then invokes the Xilinx place-and-route tool provided 
in the ISE 9.1i platform to realize the designs required by the AGT. 
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Figure 5.4: Fault Isolation Using FIAT – An Overview 
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Since it is not viable to destructively modify the FPGA hardware resources, stuck-at 
faults need to be simulated in the configurations to enable analysis of the AGT algorithm.  
Stuck-at faults are simulated in the experiments by editing all configurations to exhibit 
behavior consistent with the presence of a stuck-at fault at one of the input pins of a 
specified LUT.  To inject the fault, FIAT converts the NCD file, which describes the 
placed-and-routed design, to the Xilinx Description Language (XDL) format using the xdl 
command line tool provided by Xilinx.  This text file is then edited to modify the logic 
function instantiated on the target fault-affected LUT.  The presence of a stuck-at fault 
ties the signal at the input of the fault-affected LUT to zero or one.  After fault injection, 
the XDL file is converted back to an NCD file.  Placement and routing is then completed 
automatically using the Xilinx tools included in the ISE 9.1i suite. 
FIAT precludes the need to edit the configuration bitstream directly.  Throughout the 
design flow, the Xilinx 9.1i ISE tools are used for all processes except for those that parse 
and edit the UCF and XDL files.  The Xilinx design tools, such as netgen, par, ngdbuild, 
and fuse are invoked by FIAT in the design flow to place and route the edited designs.  
This principle of interfering minimally with the functions of the Xilinx ISE reduces 
accidental bitstream errors that may invalidate the design or irrecoverably damage the 
FPGA. 
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CHAPTER 6: CHARACTERISTICS, CAPABILITIES, AND 
METRICS FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
Experiments on the AGT algorithms were conducted using post-place-and-route designs 
created for the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA.  A 56-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES-56) 
encryption/decryption implementation was used in generating the data.  Sections 6.1, 6.2, 
and 6.3 present results from these experiments with regards to the efficacy and the impact 
of system parameters on the algorithm. 
6.1. Experimental Configuration for the Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA 
The AGT, together with FIAT, implements the controller for autonomous fault handling.  
As shown is Figure 5.4, this controller receives observed feedback and updates the design 
population across stages.  FIAT has been constructed as part of the work presented using 
the Python programming language to provide APIs to edit resource constraints, introduce 
stuck-at-faults, and generate post-place-and-route designs, as described previously in 
Section 5.9. 
Experiments were conducted on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA xc2vp4-7ff672 model using the 
Xilinx ISE 9.1i design platform.  The 7ff672 package provides 3008 slices and 348 Input-
Output Blocks (IOBs). 
To analyze performance of the algorithm, the following characteristics are defined by the 
functionality of the application implemented on the FPGA: 
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Definition 6.1.  The application resource demand, nreqd is the minimal cardinality of any 
design configuration |ci|, required to implement the application on the FPGA.   
Definition 6.2.  The resource redundancy ratio, rr is defined as the ratio of the 
application resource demand to the cardinality of the set of all resources |R| 
 || R
n
rr reqd=  (6.1) 
Definition 6.3.  The critical cardinality is the cardinality of |SC| such that |SC| = nreqd. 
Definition 6.4.  The prime realization is the index i, of the first identified subset ci, which 
satisfies the two conditions: ci ⊂  and |ci| ≥  nreqd. S
Let: 
p be the population size 
R  be the total number of resources 
T  be the total number of tests to exhaustively test the configurations 
A be the mean articulation rate of the population,  
and  
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ρ be the fault articulation rate for a configuration, defined as follows: 
 rr=ρ .A (6.2) 
Additionally, the probability that a given configuration is affected by a single random 
fault in any of the R resources is given by the resource redundancy ratio ρ. 
Since the tests are independent of each other, and the results of the random tests follow a 
binomial distribution, the probability that exactly n faults are observed in S tests is given 
by: 
 P(n) =  (6.3) nSn
n
S −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
)1( ρρ
Let the outcome x be defined as the number of the successes identified in S tests.  A 
success is when a fault is observed.  The cumulative distribution function (cdf) denoted as 
F(X) describes the probability that the outcome x ≤ X.   
The cdf for x successes in S tests, where the probability of success is ρ, is given by: 
 ∑
≤
=≤=
xx
i
i
xPxXPSxF )()(),;( ρ  (6.4) 
Various methods to approximate bounds for the cdf exist, notably when x < Sρ, the 
Hoeffding’s inequality yields the upper bound: 
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Then, from Equation (7.2), the probability that a certain configuration is observed as 
being faulty at least once over S tests on the population is given by the complementary 
cumulative distribution function (ccdf), given by  
 P(X ≥ x) =  ),;(1 ρSxF−  (6.6) 
Of particular interest is the probability that a particular configuration is observed as being 
faulty at least once after S  tests.  This probability can be calculated by noting that the 
probability that a certain configuration is selected for testing is (1/p).  This modifies the 
probability for success to (ρ/p) as compared to ρ earlier.  
The probability that a particular configuration is observed as being faulty at least once 
after S tests is therefore given by: 
 P(X ≥ 1) = 1- F(1;S,(ρ/p)) (6.7) 
and the upper bound is approximated as: 
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Let μ n be the mean number of tests for n different configurations to be identified as 
faulty.   
The mean number of tests before one configuration is identified as faulty is the mean of 
the binomial distribution, defined as: 
 μ 1= Sρ (6.9) 
The mean of the number of tests required to identify another configuration as being faulty 
is the sum of the mean time taken for one configuration to be identified as faulty, and the 
mean of the number of tests where another configuration is paired with the faulty 
configuration, or, itself articulates the fault, therefore: 
 μ 2 = μ 1 + S
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Further, since comparing a configuration to a faulty configuration will result in the 
configuration being marked as Suspect,  the probability that all the configurations are 
marked as faulty is given by the probability that a faulty configuration is chosen, and all 
the other configurations are chosen in turn to be paired with the faulty configuration.  
The DES-56 implementation utilizes 304 slices and 191 bonded IOBs.  Thus, for the fault 
isolation experiments, the application resource demand, nreqd = 304.  The total gate-
equivalent count for the design is 5266.  The area under test on the FPGA can be varied 
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by controlling the total resources, R, available for placing and routing the design.  This 
enables varying rr for the experiments.  Initially, the DES-56 core was synthesized, 
mapped, placed, and routed on the FPGA.  This model was later modified using FIAT 
according to the requirements of the AGT to form configurations and test stages.  For 
each of these configurations, a simulation executable was created using a testbench.  The 
inputs for the DES-56 circuits were obtained from the National Bureau of Standards 
publication 500-20 [61].  These inputs comprehensively test the functionality of hardware 
implementations of DES-56.  Sixty of these inputs, representing a cross-section of the 
NBS test suite were used to create the test bench. 
6.2. Isolation Progress Across Test Stages in AGT 
Figure 6.1 shows the progress of defect isolation across various stages for ppreset= 5 for 
three different experimental runs.  The best performance is seen in experiment 1, where 
fault isolation is completed using 5 stages of tests.  A total of 21 different configurations 
were created to identify the single defective resource.  In the first test stage, three 
individuals were created, one of which utilized the fault-affected resource and articulated 
the fault.  Thus, at the end of stage 1, the number of suspect resources drops from 625 to 
304.  The two individuals in stage 1 that do not utilize the defective slice are the prime 
realizations of the circuit which can provide fault-free implementations on demand.  
Also, by the end of stage 1, | S | = 625–304 = 314 > nreqd, and thus, critical cardinality is 
met.  In stages 2, 3, and 4, five configurations each are created, as pstage = ppreset = 5.  
Since the equal sharing method is used to create the configurations in each group, the 
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number of suspect resources decreases by a factor of ⎥⎥⎥⎢⎢⎢ stagep
⎤⎡ S ||  in each stage.  In the final 
stage, since |S| = 3, only three configurations are created.  The number of discrepant 
outputs in all the tests is equal to the number of  test stages since at the occurrence of the 
first discrepant output, the creation of a new group of configurations is initiated. 
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Figure 6.1: Fault Isolation Progress Across Stages for ppreset = 5 
As shown in Figure 6.1, in the Experiment 2, no progress is made in the third stage of 
testing, where the number of suspect resources remains at 61.  This is due to the fact that 
the individual utilizing the fault-affected resource does not articulate the fault, leading to 
a stasis in the system.  In stage 4, five new individuals replace the configurations in the 
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population.  In this stage, the configuration with the faulty resource articulates the fault, 
leading to a decrease in the number of suspects.  Similarly, in the third experiment, stasis 
occurs in the fifth stage.  This increases the number of stages to isolate the fault and the 
total number of configurations created. 
In the best performing experiment, five stages were required, and five tests with 
discrepant outputs are observed before the defect is isolated.  Even in the worst case, with 
a test stage containing configurations that do not articulate the fault, only five 
discrepancies are observed.  Non-articulating individuals that use the faulty resource 
increase the time taken to scour the defects, but do not affect the observed goodput.  In 
addition, in all these case, since rr < 0.5, the prime realization, as well as a non-suspect 
set of resources with a cardinality greater than the critical cardinality are obtained after 
the first discrepant test output. 
6.3. Effect of Population Preset on Defect Scouring Rate 
The scouring rate is directly proportional to the population preset, ppreset.  Table 6.1 lists 
the observed defect scouring performance for varying values of ppreset.  A total of 15 
experiments were conducted for each value of ppreset.  The physical logical resource 
overhead for the AGT-based technique can be varied by adjusting the resource 
redundancy ratio, rr.  In all these experiments, initially, |R| = 625.  This value was chosen 
as 252 = 625 yields a redundancy ratio rr = 304/625 = 0.49 ≈ 0.5.  As the column labeled 
M2 in Table II indicates, throughout the experiments, a subset of non-suspect resources, 
with cardinality > nreqd, is identified after the first stage of testing.  Similarly, from the S
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results for metric M3 in Table 6.1, it is shown that the prime realization, which provides a 
fault-free replacement configuration, is consistently identified from within the first group 
of configurations.  The number of discrepant outputs, or positive tests required to isolate 
the fault is the same as the number of stages, since the articulation of a fault will 
immediately improve the scouring rate and trigger formation of the next stage of tests. 
Table 6.1: Results from Experiments With Varying Population Preset Values 
ppreset 
Fault Resolution Metrics* Number of Stages Number of Configurations 
M1 M2 M3 Best Worst Mean Best Worst Mean 
5 5 1 1 5 7 5.53 21 31 23.67 
10 4 1 1 4 5 4.27 27 37 29.67 
15 3 1 1 3 4 3.20 35 38 35.47 
20 3 1 1 3 4 3.13 39 59 42.73 
25 3 1 1 3 4 3.13 41 66 44.27 
* Fault Resolution Metrics: 
M1: Number of observed discrepant outputs before the defective resource is isolated. 
M2: Number of stages required to surpass critical cardinality for S . 
M3: Number of stages required to identify the prime realization. 
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Figure 6.2: Effect of Population Preset on the Scouring Rate 
Figure 6.2 shows the best defect scouring performance of AGT for increasing values of 
ppreset.  Each curve depicts the size of the suspect pool, |S|, at the beginning of the test 
stage depicted on the x-axis.  For all values of ppreset , population size, pstage = 3 in the first 
stage of testing, by Equation(6.7).  In all other stages except the last stage, pstage = ppreset.  
In the last stage, pstage is equal to the number of remaining suspect resources.  The slope 
of the curve is proportional to the defect scouring ratio, and it increases proportionately 
with ppreset.  Except in the initial and last stages, defect scouring proceeds at a logarithmic 
rate, when the articulation rate for the configuration utilizing the defective resource is 
non-zero.  Most significantly, across all values of  ppreset  the defective is isolated with 5 
or fewer positive tests.  Assuming that the time taken to reconfigure the device is 
insignificant when compared to the mean time between defects, the AGT-based method 
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can tolerate faults with minimal loss of goodput, with ppreset = 5, which will require the 
minimal number of reconfigurations. 
The total number of configurations created in each of the five best performing 
experiments are shown in Figure 6.3.  As ppreset increases, the total number of 
configurations increases.  However, there is only two extra configurations are required 
for ppreset = 25 as opposed to ppreset = 20.  Figure 6.3 also shows the number of test stages 
as a function of ppreset.  With increasing ppreset , each stage reduces the number of suspects 
by a factor proportional to the population size.  Thus, with increasing ppreset, though a 
decreased number of stages are required, the total number of configurations required is 
increased. 
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Figure 6.3: Total Test Stages and Configurations Created for Varying Population Presets 
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6.4. Maintaining System Throughput During Fault Isolation 
System goodput, defined as the percentage of useful outputs, can be maintained at a 
pre-defined level throughout the fault isolation process using a feedback mechanism and 
an observer-controller model.  The system goodput decreases each time there is a 
discrepant output – fault isolation will proceed faster with more frequent discrepancies.  
Thus, the tradeoff involved in maintaining goodput is that fault isolation will proceed at a 
slower rate. 
Figure 6.4 shows the observed goodput as a function of the number of tests completed for 
three different values of required goodput throughout the fault isolation process.  In all 
three experiments, the value used for the population present,  ppreset = 5.  In the first  
experiment, the system-level goal is to maintain a goodput of 0.99.  A discrepant output 
is observed in the first ten tests, leading to a goodput of 0.90.  Since this is lower than the 
performance goal, the system responds by utilizing the fault-free configuration until the 
goodput is restored to 0.99 by the hundredth test.  Afterwards, the next stage of testing 
proceeds.  When the fault-affected configuration in the second stage articulates the fault, 
the goodput drops to 0.982 by the 110th test.  Again, the system waits for the goodput to 
return to 0.99 before proceeding with conducting the third stage of tests.  After 500 tests, 
after five positive tests, fault isolation is complete.  The observed goodput will then 
continue to rise past 99%.  In the second and third experiments, the goodput requirement 
is 0.95, and 0.90 respectively.  As seen in Figure 6.4, for experiment 3, the system 
goodput never falls below 90% throughout the isolation process.  After 10 tests, the 
goodput falls to 0.90 and rises subsequently until the fault is isolated in 320 tests. 
 125
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Number of Tests
O
bs
er
ve
d 
G
oo
dp
ut
Desired Goodput = 0.99
Desired Goodput = 0.95
Desired Goodput = 0.90
fault identified
 
Figure 6.4: System Goodput Vs. Total Number of Tests 
The time taken to create the configurations and reconfigure the FPGA is not reflected in 
the system goodput measurement.  The goodput measured here is that of only the AGT-
controlled system.  Since AGT verifies correct functional behavior using output response 
analysis, it is essential to have an identical fault-free implementation of the same 
functionality, which would provide the correct outputs to which the outputs of the AGT-
monitored configurations can be compared.  Under a single-fault assumption, when the 
portion of the FPGA monitored by the observer is being reconfigured, the system outputs 
are provided by the other fault-free configuration. 
Overall, the AGT-based autonomous method can isolate the single defective with a 
minimal number of positive tests, as low as 3, as listed in Table 6.1.  This result is made 
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even more significant by the fact that this method avoids the use of exhaustive serial test 
procedures.  Of all the previous approaches in Table 2.1, the roving STARS approach is 
the only comprehensive fault tolerance solution that isolates defects at a granularity lower 
than 1% of the total resources on an FPGA.  Compared to this approach, the AGT-based 
technique has a minimal fault detection latency, and thus a higher expected goodput.  In 
addition, as shown by the experiments where the goodput is maintained at a pre-defined 
value, the AGT algorithm can be used to build an autonomous fault tolerant solution that 
accomplishes system-level goals. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation demonstrated the feasibility of an integrated approach to fault handling 
in FPGAs.  A population of alternatives, when combined with a competitive evolutionary 
strategy, provides a framework that refurbishes fault-affected configurations.  Group 
testing-based fault isolation methods are presented.  Based on a straightforward FPGA 
model, an autonomous group-testing algorithm for runtime fault isolation that removes 
the need for exhaustive test inputs and the need for the system to be taken offline is 
developed.  To this end, a discrepancy detector is designed for fault detection.  In order to 
demonstrate the flexibility of group testing techniques, a group testing-based technique 
for identifying faulty FPGA embedded cores is also presented that highlights the utility of 
group testing for exhaustive functional testing.  FIAT, a fault analysis toolkit, is 
developed to enable fault isolation experiments on FPGAs.  Finally, an autonomous 
group testing technique is demonstrated that maintains the system goodput at pre-defined 
levels throughout the fault isolation process.   
7.1. Graceful Degradation of Performance 
In applications where the FPGA on which the application is deployed cannot be retrieved 
for repair or replacement, graceful degradation of service is a highly desirable quality.  
Deep-space deployment of FPGAs provides an example of such a scenario.  In 
deep-space, the probability of failures also increases due to the absence of a protective 
atmosphere.  In this high-ionizing radiation environment, multiple hardware faults 
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induced by high-energy particles demand a fault tolerance implementation that can 
ensure that the system remains available even in the presence of faults.  While fast 
recovery from faults is essential, certain applications might demand that the FPGA 
continue to provide service, at reduced availability, as opposed to not providing any 
service at all during the recovery process.  A system that degrades gracefully as faults 
appear should be able to handle faults while continuing to provide acceptable levels of 
service.  Through the elimination of additional test vectors and by using a temporal 
assessment process based on aging and outlier identification, CRR provides a self-
regulating repair mechanism with reduced downtime which is also capable of such 
graceful degradation. 
With a limited pool of resources on an FPGA, sustainable fault handling is achieved only 
when the available resources are recycled.  Such resource recycling needs to leverage 
residual functionality provided by defective resources.  A LUT which has a stuck-at fault 
at one of the input pins might still provide residual functionality.  Section 3.8 shows that 
such functionality can be leveraged by a system that measures performance by evaluating 
the outputs to actual runtime inputs – as opposed to a system where the resources are 
exhaustively tested using additional test vectors.  As an example, an evolutionary 
algorithm that relies on a fitness function-based evaluation of a configuration’s 
performance might tolerate a LUT with a stuck-at fault at one input pin, if the faulty input 
pin is not used by the configuration.  A design in which the faulty four-input LUT is only 
required to receive three-bit inputs will be identified as being fully-fit by an FPGA, but 
will be precluded from use if the resources were to be tested exhaustively.   
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7.2. Improving Evolutionary Repair using a Population of Alternatives 
Two major improvements over a more conventional GA-based repair scheme are 
observed.  First, this dissertation provides evidence for a significant improvement in fault 
handling capability by exploiting population diversity during all phases of the fault 
handling process.  By relying on the inherent information contained in a population of 
alternatives, the approach improves on previous techniques for evolutionary fault 
handling that have the objective of creating a single best-fit individual.  In CRR, the 
population of alternatives is classified into separate pools of relative operability, and all 
individuals are refurbished over time with no one individual being preferred over others.  
As opposed to previous approaches, the goal of CRR is to maintain a healthy population, 
as opposed to creating one single individual that acts as the responder in the case of 
faults.  Secondly, GAs asymptotically approach the perfect configuration.  With CRR, 
these partially fit configurations provide an increased benefit.  CRR’s competitive focus 
automatically chooses the best performing configurations for a given input space.   
A significant observation made during fault refurbishment experiments is that a system 
that functions in a fully-fit manner can be realized using configurations that are not 
themselves fully-fit.  Individuals that perform best for the subset of inputs that are 
observed provide high goodput even when they may not demonstrate ideal behavior for 
the entire input space.  As the subset of observed inputs change over time, alternate 
partially-fit configurations may be identified that provide high quality service for the new 
inputs.  Such redundancy can occur at minimal physical resource overhead and is limited 
by the storage space requirement and reconfiguration time.  Interestingly, the dual-
 130
competition system presented in CRR can easily be extended to three competing modules 
to provide a more traditional TMR system that can provide even higher quality of service 
at the cost of the physical resources needed to implement an extra module. 
7.3. Fast Fault Response using Group Testing 
While the evolutionary algorithm excels at recycling resources and finding solutions that 
may seem counter-intuitive, this comes at the cost of the time required to identify the 
solution.  This is where group testing-based isolation provides a direct benefit by fast 
identification of the fault-affected resource.  More importantly, by tracking the resource 
allocation across configurations, this also provides alternative configurations to respond 
to faults with minimal latency.  The group testing-based fault isolation method presented 
in this work demonstrates the capability for the fast isolation of logic faults, and, more 
importantly, the ability to maintain the system’s availability and goodput throughout the 
fault isolation process.  For example, Section 6.6 shows how the AGT system maintains 
the system goodput at 90%.  This does not have to delay the speed with which a 
functioning configuration is identified to respond to the fault.  The experiments in Section 
6.3 show that with as few as three discrepant outputs, the system identifies the faulty 
resources for a DES implementation.  Due to the use of multiple alternative 
configurations that are designed in a way that minimizes the probability for all 
configurations to be affected by the same hardware resource fault, a handy replacement 
for guaranteed service is immediately available in case of a single fault.   
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The versatility of group testing-based isolation is clearly demonstrated by the case study 
where fault embedded cores in FPGAs were identified using BIST techniques.  Group 
testing techniques are also shown to suitable for exhaustive offline testing, and can 
provide a significant improvement in fault isolation time over a more conventional BIST 
approach as demonstrated.  A 640 DSP core FPGA device is tested exhaustively with a 
30% testing resource overhead in a single stage of tests that are designed using group 
testing principles.  An adaptive multi-stage group testing algorithm can provide fault 
isolation for online FPGAs.  This dissertation demonstrates viability, and the methods 
presented here can be further enhanced and improved based on the specific system in 
which they are implemented.  For example, a group testing regimen can be developed for 
TMR systems, and improvements to many other exhaustive testing are possible using 
various group testing techniques that have already been analyzed and researched.  
7.4. Future Work 
While CRR is show to be capable of achieving refurbishment in combinational logic 
circuits in Section 3.8, it remains to be seen if it can be extended to sequential logic 
circuits.  The challenge in extending the approach to sequential logic circuits is primarily 
one of being able to formulate a strategy for evaluating the fitness of alternative designs.  
For any sequential circuit of substantial size, the number of states of the circuit, and 
transitions between the states make fitness evaluation challenging.  A general strategy  to 
enable evolutionary repair of sequential circuits remains to be addressed.  Also, CRR 
provides coverage for only the logic resources.  Though there are several approaches for 
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tolerating faults in the interconnect resources, the choices are severely limited when it 
comes to online isolation of such faults.  Thus, the integration of interconnect-fault and 
logic-fault handling strategies for online fault-handling remains a major challenge. 
Partial reconfiguration in COTS FPGAs is currently hindered by severe limitations, and 
support for partial reconfiguration is subjective at best.  Currently, the time taken for 
partial reconfiguration is a significant bottleneck in effecting repairs.  The lack of well-
tested and supported APIs to reconfigure only a portion of the FPGA while keeping the 
rest of the FPGA operational is also a major roadblock [62].  To realize fast online fault 
handling, there is a need for more open standards and improved support for partial 
reconfiguration.  In commercial SRAM FPGAs  there is a very high level of dependency 
on the design tools provided by the manufacturer.  With an open bitstream structure, and 
more portable design tools, it may be possible in the future to instantiate evolutionary 
algorithms within the design loop.  Currently, due to the closed nature of the 
configuration bitstream’s structure, one has to rely on the Xilinx tools to produce the 
configuration bitstream, and it is almost impossible to produce and modify the bitstream 
in a guaranteed fashion to achieve desired functional changes. 
Finally, further enhancements can be made to FIAT, and FIAT can be used to analyze the 
performance of alternative group testing strategies.  Since it provides a set of tools for the 
injection of faults, and to manage and track resource allocation across configurations, it 
should serve as a useful tool for further experiments in FPGA fault tolerance.  While this 
dissertation provides a new paradigm for a hardware-in-the-loop online fault tolerance 
 133
strategy, several alternative target technologies, such as software reliability tools, or 
future nano-scale mechanisms can benefit from the same principles.   
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